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Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder 
No. 12-96 
Ruling Below: Shelby C01lnty, Ala. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 20 12), petitionjor cert. 
filed, 2012 WL 1759997 (U.S. 2012). 
Shelby County, Alabama, filed a challenge to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging the Act exceeds Congress's enumerated 
powers because the preclearance burdens imposed can no longer be justified and the geographic 
coverage disparities are no longer sufficiently related to the targeted problem. The district court 
found for the United States and granted summary judgment, upholding Section 5's 
constitutionality as a "congment and propoliional remedy." The Court of Appeals for the D. C. 
Circuit affirmed, upholding Section 5 under the "congmence and proportionality" standard and 
deferring to Congress. 
Question Presented: Whether Congress's decision in 2006 to reauthorize Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act under the pre-existing coverage formula of Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights 
Act exceeded its authority under the Fifteenth Amendment and thus violated the Tenth 
Amendment and Article IV of the United States Constitution. 
SHELBY COUNTY, ALABAMA, Appellant, 
v. 
Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., in his Official Capacity as Attorney General of the United States, et 
aI., Appellees. 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
Decided May 18,2012 
[Excerpt; some text, footnotes and citations 
omitted.] 
T A TEL, Circuit Judge: 
In Northwest A1Istin M1Inicipal Utility 
District No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 
(2009), the Supreme Court raised serious 
questions about the continued 
constitutionality of section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965. Section 5 prohibits 
certain "covered jurisdictions" from making 
any change in their voting procedures 
without first demonstrating to either the 
Attorney General or a three-judge district 
court in Washington that the change "neither 
has the purpose nor will have the effect of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on 
account of race or color." 42 U.S.c. § 
1973c(a). The Supreme Court warned that 
the burdens imposed by section 5 may no 
longer be justified by current needs and that 
its geographic coverage may no longer 
sufficiently relate to the problem it targets. 
Although the Court had no occasion to 
resolve these questions, they are now 
squarely before us. Shelby County, 
Alabama, a covered jurisdiction, contends 
that when Congress reauthorized section 5 in 
2006, it exceeded its enumerated powers. 
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The district court disagreed and granted 
summary judgment for the Attorney 
General. For the reasons set forth in this 
opinion, we affirm. 
I. 
The Framers of our Constitution sought to 
construct a federal government powerful 
enough to function effectively yet limited 
enough to preserve the hard-earned liberty 
fought for in the War of Independence. They 
feared not state government, but centralized 
national government, long the hallmark of 
Old World monarchies. As a result, "[t]he 
powers delegated by the ... Constitution to 
the federal government, are few and 
defined," while "[t]hose which are to remain 
in the State governments are numerous and 
indefinite." The Federalist No. 45 (James 
Madison) .... 
But the experience of the nascent Republic, 
divided by slavery, taught that states too 
could threaten individual liberty. So after the 
Civil War, the Reconstruction Amendments 
were added to the Constitution to limit state 
power .... 
Following Reconstruction, however, "the 
blight of racial discrimination in voting ... 
infected the electoral process in parts of our 
country for nearly a century." South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 
(1966). The courts and Congress eventually 
responded. The Supreme Court struck down 
grandfather clauses, Guinn v. United States, 
238 U.S. 347 (1915), and white primaries, 
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
Congress "enact[ ed] civil rights legislation 
in 1957, 1960, and 1964, which sought to 
'facilitat[e] case-by-case litigation against 
voting discrimination.'" Shelby Cn ty. , 811 
F.Supp.2d at 430. But Congress soon 
determined that such measures were 
inadequate: case-by-case litigation, In 
addition to being expensive, was slow-
slow to come to a result and slow to respond 
once a state switched from one 
discriminatory device to the next-and thus 
had "done little to cure the problem of 
voting discrimination." Katzenbach, 383 
U.S. at 313. Determined to "rid the country 
of racial discrimination in voting," id. at 
315, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965. 
Unlike prior legislation, the 1965 Act 
combined a permanent, case-by-case 
enforcement mechanism with a set of more 
stringent, temporary remedies designed to 
target those areas of the country where racial 
discrimination in voting was concentrated .. 
Reaching beyond case-by-case litigation and 
applying only in certain "covered 
jurisdictions," section 5-the focus of this 
litigation-"prescribes remedies ... which 
go into effect without any need for prior 
adjudication." Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 327-
28. Section 5 suspends "all changes in state 
election procedure until they [ are] submitted 
to and approved by a three-judge Federal 
District Court in Washington, D.C., or the 
Attorney General." Nw. Austin, 129 S.Ct. at 
2509. A jurisdiction seeking to change its 
voting laws or procedures must either 
submit the change to the Attorney General 
or seek preclearance directly from the three-
judge court. If it opts for the former and if 
the Attorney General lodges no objection 
within sixty days, the proposed law can take 
effect. 42 U.S.c. § 1973c(a). But if the 
Attorney General lodges an objection, the 
submitting jurisdiction may either request 
reconsideration, 28 C.F.R. § 51.45(a), or 
seek a de novo determination from the three-
judge district court. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a). 
Either way, preclearance may be granted 
only if the jurisdiction demonstrates that the 
proposed change to its voting law neither 
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"has the purpose nor . . . the effect of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on 
account of race or color." Jd. 
Prior to section 5' s enactment, states could 
stay ahead of plaintiffs and courts "'by 
passing new discriminatory voting laws as 
soon as the old ones had been struck 
down.'" Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 
140 (1976). But section 5 "shift[ed] the 
advantage of time and inertia from the 
perpetrators of the evil to its victim." 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328. It did so by 
placing "the burden on covered jurisdictions 
to show their voting changes are 
nondiscriminatory before those changes can 
be put into effect." Shelby Cnty., 811 
F.Supp.2d at 431. Section 5 thus "pre-
empted the most powerful tools of black 
disenfranchisement," Nw. Austin, 129 S.Ct. 
at 2509, resulting in "undeniable" 
improvements in the protection of minority 
voting rights, id. at 2511. 
Section 4(b) contains a formula that, as 
originally enacted, applied section 5's 
preclearance requirements to any state or 
political subdivision of a state that 
"maintained a voting test or device as of 
November 1, 1964, and had less than 50% 
voter registration or turnout in the 1964 
presidential election." Shelby Cnty., 811 
F.Supp.2d at 432. Congress chose these 
criteria carefully. It knew precisely which 
states it sought to cover and crafted the 
criteria to capture those jurisdictions. Jd. 
Unsurprisingly, the jurisdictions originally 
covered in their entirety, Alabama, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and 
Virginia, "were those southern states with 
the worst historical records of racial 
discrimination in voting." Jd. 
Because section 4(b)'s formula could be 
both over- and under-inclusive, Congress 
incorporated two procedures for adjusting 
coverage over time. First, as it existed in 
1965, section 4(a) allowed jurisdictions to 
earn exemption from coverage by obtaining 
from a three-judge district court a 
declaratory judgment that in the previous 
five years (i.e., before they became subject 
to the Act) they had used no test or device 
"for the purpose or with the effect of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on 
account of race or color." 1965 Act § 4(a). 
This "bailout" provision, as subsequently 
amended, addresses potential 
overinclusiveness, allowing jurisdictions 
with clean records to terminate their section 
5 preclearance obligations. Second, section 
3 (c) authorizes federal cOUlis to require 
preclearance by any non-covered state or 
political subdivision found to have violated 
the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. 42 
U.S.C. § 1973a( c). Specifically, courts 
presiding over voting discrimination suits 
may "retain jurisdiction for such period as 
[they] may deem appropriate" and order that 
during that time no voting change take effect 
unless either approved by the cOUli or 
unopposed by the Attorney General. Jd. This 
judicial "bail-in" provision addresses the 
formula's potential underinclusiveness. 
As originally enacted in 1965, section 5 was 
to remain in effect for five years. In SOllth 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Supreme Court 
sustained the constitutionality of section 5, 
holding that its provisions "are a valid 
means for carrying out the commands of the 
Fifteenth Amendment." 383 U.S. at 337. 
Congress subsequently renewed the 
temporary provisions, including sections 
4(b) and 5, in 1970 (for five years), then in 
1975 (for seven years), and again in 1982 
(for twenty-five years). In each version, 
"[t]he coverage formula [in section 4(b) ] 
remained the same, based on the use of 
voting-eligibility tests [or devices] and the 
rate of registration and turnout among all 
voters, but the pertinent dates for assessing 
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these criteria moved from 1964 to include 
1968 and eventually 1972." Nw. Austin, 129 
S.Ct. at 2510. In 1975 Congress made one 
significant change to section 4(b)'s scope: it 
amended the definition of "test or device" to 
include the practice of providing only 
English-language voting materials in 
jurisdictions with significant non-English-
speaking populations. Act of Aug. 6, 1975, 
Pub.L. No. 94-73, § 203, 89 Stat. 400, 401-
02. Although not altering the basic coverage 
formula, this change expanded section 4(b)'s 
scope to encompass jurisdictions with 
records of voting discrimination against 
"language minorities." See Briscoe v. Bell, 
432 U.S. 404, 405 (1977). The Supreme 
Court sustained the constitutionality of each 
extension, respectively, in Georgia v. United 
States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973), City of Rome v. 
United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980), and 
Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 
(1999). 
Significantly for the issue before us, the 
1982 version of the Voting Rights Act made 
bailout substantially more permissive. . . . 
[A ]fter 1982 the Act allowed bailout by any 
jurisdiction with a "clean" voting rights 
record over the previous ten years. ld. The 
1982 reauthorization also permitted a greater 
number of jurisdictions to seek bailout. 
Previously, "only covered states (such as 
Alabama) or separately-covered political 
subdivisions (such as individual North 
Carolina counties) were eligible to seek 
bailout." ld. After 1982, political 
subdivisions within a covered state could 
bailout even if the state as a whole was 
ineligible. ld. 
Setting the stage for this litigation, Congress 
extended the Voting Rights Act for another 
twenty-five years in 2006 .... Congress also 
amended section 5 to overrule the Supreme 
COUli's decisions in Georgia v. Ashcroft, 
539 U.S. 461, 479-80 (2003) and Reno v. 
Bossier Parish School Board, 528 U.S. 320, 
328 (2000) ("Bossier 11"). 
The 2006 Act's constitutionality was 
immediately challenged by "a small utility 
district" subject to its provisions. See Nw. 
A1Istin, 129 S.Ct. at 2508. . .. On appeal, 
the Supreme Court identified two "serious .. 
. questions" about section 5' s continued 
constitutionality, namely, whether the 
"current burdens" it imposes are "justified 
by current needs," and whether its "disparate 
geographic coverage is sufficiently related 
to the problem that it targets." Nw. Austin, 
129 S.Ct. at 2512-13. But invoking the 
constitutional avoidance doctrine, id. at 
2508, 2513, the Court interpreted the statute 
to allow any covered jurisdiction, including 
the utility district bringing suit in that case, 
to seek bailout, thus avoiding the need to 
resolve the "big question," id. at 2508: Did 
Congress exceed its constitutional authority 
when it reauthorized section 5? Now that 
question is squarely presented. 
II. 
Shelby County filed suit in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia, seeking 
both a declaratory judgment that sections 
4(b) and 5 of the Voting Rights Act are 
facially unconstitutional and a permanent 
injunction prohibiting the Attorney General 
from enforcing them. Shelby Cnty., 811 
F.Supp.2d at 427. Unlike the utility district 
in Northwest A1Istin, Shelby County never 
sought bailout, and for good reason. Because 
the county had held several special elections 
under a law for which it failed to seek 
preclearance and because the Attorney 
General had recently objected to 
annexations and a redistricting plan 
proposed by a city within Shelby County, 
the County was clearly ineligible for bailout. 
See id. at 446 n. 6. As the district cOUli-
Judge John D. Bates-recognized, the 
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"serious constitutional questions" raised in 
Northwest Austin could "no longer be 
avoided." ld at 427. 
Addressing these questions in a thorough 
opinion, the district court upheld the 
constitutionality of the challenged 
provisions and granted summary judgment 
for the Attorney General. After reviewing 
the extensive legislative record and the 
arguments made by Shelby County, the 
Attorney General, and a group of defendant-
intervenors, the district court concluded that 
"Section 5 remains a 'congruent and 
proportional remedy' to the 21 st century 
problem of voting discrimination in covered 
jurisdictions." ld at 428. Responding to the 
Supreme Court's concerns in Northwest 
Austin, the district court found the record 
evidence of contemporary discrimination in 
covered jurisdictions "plainly adequate to 
justify section 5's strong remedial and 
preventative measures," id at 492, and to 
support Congress's predictive judgment that 
failure to reauthorize section 5 '''would 
leave minority citizens with the inadequate 
remedy of a Section 2 action,'" id at 498. 
This evidence consisted of thousands of 
pages of testimony, reports, and data 
regarding racial disparities in voter 
registration, voter turnout, and electoral 
success; the nature and number of section 5 
objections; judicial preclearance suits and 
section 5 enforcement actions; successful 
section 2 litigation; the use of "more 
information requests" and federal election 
observers; racially polarized voting; and 
section 5's deterrent effect.ld at 465-66. 
As to section 4(b), the district court 
acknowledged that the legislative record 
"primarily focused on the persistence of 
voting discrimination in covered 
jurisdictions-rather than on the 
comparative levels of voting discrimination 
in covered and non-covered jurisdictions." 
ld at 507. Nonetheless, the district comi 
pointed to "several significant pieces of 
evidence suggesting that the 21 st century 
problem of voting discrimination remains 
more prevalent in those jurisdictions that 
have historically been subject to the 
preclearance requirement"-including the 
disproportionate number of successful 
section 2 suits in covered jurisdictions and 
the "continued prevalence of voting 
discrimination in covered jurisdictions 
notwithstanding the considerable deterrent 
effect of Section 5." ld at 506-07. Thus, 
although observing that Congress's 
reauthorization "ensured that Section 4(b) 
would continue to focus on those 
jurisdictions with the worst historical 
records of voting discrimination," id at 506, 
the district court found this continued focus 
justified by current evidence that 
discrimination remained concentrated in 
those jurisdictions. See id Finally, the 
district court emphasized that Congress had 
based reauthorization not on "a perfunctory 
review of a few isolated examples of voting 
discrimination by covered jurisdictions," but 
had "'approached its task seriously and with 
great care.'" ld at 496. Given this, the 
district court concluded that Congress's 
predictive judgment about the continued 
need for section 5 in covered jurisdictions 
was due "substantial deference," id at 498, 
and therefore "decline[ d] to overturn 
Congress's carefully considered judgment," 
id at 508. Our review is de novo. See 
McGrath v. Clinton, 666 F.3d 1377, 1379 
(D.C.Cir.2012). 
On appeal, Shelby County reiterates its 
argument that, given the federalism costs 
section 5 imposes, the provision can be 
justified only by contemporary evidence of 
the kind of "'unremitting and ingenious 
defiance'" that existed when the Voting 
Rights Act was originally passed in 1965. 
Appellant's Br. 8. Insisting that the 
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legislative record lacks "evidence of a 
systematic campaign of voting 
discrimination and gamesmanship by the 
covered jurisdictions," Shelby County 
contends that section 5's remedy is 
unconstitutional because it is no longer 
congruent and proportional to the problem it 
seeks to cure. lei. at 8-9. In addition, Shelby 
County argues, section 4(b) contains an 
"obsolete" coverage formula that fails to 
identify the problem jurisdictions, and 
because the jurisdictions it covers are not 
uniquely problematic, the formula is no 
longer rational '" in both practice and 
theory.'" Appellant's Br. 11-12. 
III. 
Northwest Austin sets the course for our 
analysis, directing us to conduct two 
principal inquiries. First, emphasizing that 
section 5 "authorizes federal intrusion into 
sensitive areas of state and local 
policymaking that imposes substantial 
federalism costs," the Court made clear that 
"[p ]ast success alone . . . is not adequate 
justification to retain the preclearance 
requirements." 129 S.Ct. at 251l. 
Conditions in the South, the COUli pointed 
out, "have unquestionably improved": racial 
disparities in voter registration and turnout 
have diminished or disappeared, and 
"minority candidates hold office at 
unprecedented levels." lei. Of course, "[i]t 
may be that these improvements are 
insufficient and that conditions continue to 
warrant preclearance under the Act." lei. at 
2511-12. But "the Act imposes current 
burdens," and we must determine whether 
those burdens are "justified by current 
needs." lei. at 2512. 
Second, the Act, through section 4(b)'s 
coverage formula, "differentiates between 
the States, despite our historic tradition that 
all the States enjoy equal sovereignty." lei. 
And while equal sovereignty "'does not bar. 
.. remedies for local evils, '" iel., the Court 
warned that section 4(b)'s coverage formula 
may "fail [ ] to account for current political 
conditions"-that is, "[t]he evil that § 5 is 
meant to address may no longer be 
concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out 
for preclearance." lei. These concerns, the 
COUli explained, "are underscored by the 
argument" that section 5 may require 
covered jurisdictions to adopt race-
conscious measures that, if adopted by non-
covered jurisdictions, could violate section 2 
of the Act or the Fourteenth Amendment. lei. 
(Kennedy, 1., concurring). To be sure, such 
"[ d] istinctions can be justified in some 
cases." lei. But given section 5's serious 
federalism costs, Northwest Austin requires 
that we ask whether section 4(b)' s "disparate 
geographic coverage is sufficiently related 
to the problem that it targets." lei. 
Before addressing Nortlnvest Austin's two 
questions, we must determine the 
appropriate standard of review. As the 
Supreme Court noted, the standard applied 
to legislation enacted pursuant to Congress's 
Fifteenth Amendment power remains 
unsettled. See tel. at 2512-l3. Reflecting this 
unceliainty, Shelby County argues that the 
"congruence and propOliionality" standard 
for Fourteenth Amendment legislation 
applies, see City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520, 
whereas the Attorney General insists that 
Congress may use "any rational means" to 
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, see 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324 .... We thus 
read Northwest Austin as sending a powerful 
signal that congruence and proportionality is 
the appropriate standard of review. In any 
event, if section 5 survives the arguably 
more rigorous "congruent and propoliional" 
standard, it would also survive Katzenbach's 
"rationality" review .... 
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We read this case law with two important 
qualifications. First, we deal here with racial 
discrimination in voting, one of the gravest 
evils that Congress can seek to redress. See 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 
(1886). When Congress seeks to combat 
racial discrimination in voting-protecting 
both the right to be free from discrimination 
based on race and the right to be free from 
discrimination in voting, two rights subject 
to heightened scrutiny-it acts at the apex of 
its power. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736; Lane, 
541 U.S. at 561-63. Expressly prohibited by 
the Fifteenth Amendment, racial 
discrimination in voting is uniquely harmful 
in several ways: it cannot be remedied by 
money damages and, as Congress found, 
lawsuits to enjoin discriminatory voting 
laws are costly, take years to resolve, and 
leave those elected under the challenged law 
with the benefit of incumbency. 
Second, although the federalism costs 
imposed by the statutes at issue in Hibbs and 
Lane are no doubt substantial, the federalism 
costs imposed by section 5 are a great deal 
more significant. To be sure, in most cases 
the preclearance process is "routine" and 
"efficient[ ]," resulting in prompt approval 
by the Attorney General and rarely if ever 
delaying elections. See Rea1lthorizing the 
Voting Rights Act's Temporary Provisions: 
Civil Rights and Property Rights of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Congo 312-
13 (2006) (testimony of Donald M. Wright, 
North Carolina State Board of Elections). 
But section 5 sweeps broadly, requiring 
preclearance of every voting change no 
matter how minor. Section 5 also places the 
burden on covered jurisdictions to 
demonstrate to the Attorney General or a 
three-judge district court here in Washington 
that the proposed law is not discriminatory. 
Given these significant burdens, in order to 
determine whether section 5 remains 
congruent and proportional we are obligated 
to undertake a review of the record more 
searching than the Supreme Court's review 
in Hibbs and Lane. 
Although our examination of the record will 
be probing, we remain bound by 
fundamental principles of judicial restraint. 
Time and time again the Supreme Court has 
emphasized that Congress's laws are entitled 
to a "presumption of validity." City of 
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535. As the Court has 
explained, when Congress acts pursuant to 
its enforcement authority under the 
Reconstruction Amendments, its judgments 
about "what legislation is needed . . . are 
entitled to much deference." ld. ... And 
critically for our purposes, although 
Northwest Austin raises serious questions 
about section 5' s constitutionality, nothing 
in that opinion alters our duty to resolve 
those questions using traditional principles 
of deferential review. Indeed, the Court 
reiterated not only that "judging the 
constitutionality of an Act of Congress is 
'the gravest and most delicate duty that [a 
court] is called on to perform,'" Nw. Austin, 
129 S.Ct. at 2513 (Holmes, J., concurring», 
but also that "[t]he Fifteenth Amendment 
empowers 'Congress,' not the Court, to 
determine in the first instance what 
legislation is needed to enforce it," id. 
A. 
Guided by these principles, we begin with 
Northwest Austin's first question: Are the 
current burdens imposed by section 5 
"justified by current needs"? 129 S.Ct. at 
2512. The Supreme Court raised this 
question because, as it emphasized and as 
Shelby County argues, the conditions which 
led to the passage of the Voting Rights Act 
"have unquestionably improved[,] . . . no 
doubt due in significant part to the Voting 
Rights Act itself." ld. at 2511. Congress also 
recognized this progress when it 
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reauthorized the Act, finding that "many of 
the first generation barriers to minority voter 
registration and voter turnout that were in 
place prior to the [Voting Rights Act] have 
been eliminated." H.R.Rep. No. 109-478, at 
12. The dissent's charts nicely display this 
progress. Racial disparities in voter 
registration and turnout have "narrowed 
considerably" in covered jurisdictions and 
are now largely comparable to disparities 
nationwide.ld. at 12-17; see also Dissenting 
Op. at 890-91 figs. I & II. Increased 
minority voting, in turn, has "resulted in 
significant increases in the number of 
African-Americans serving in elected 
offices." H.R.Rep. No. 109-478, at 18; see 
also Dissenting Op. at 892 fig.III. For 
example, in the six states fully covered by 
the 1965 Act, the number of African 
Americans serving in elected office 
increased from 345 to 3700 in the decades 
since 1965. H.R.Rep. No. 109-478, at 18. 
But Congress found that this progress did 
not tell the whole story. It documented 
"continued registration and turnout 
disparities" in both Virginia and South 
Carolina. ld. at 25. Virginia, in particular, 
"remain[ed] an outlier," S.Rep. No. 109-
295, at 11 (2006): although 71.6 percent of 
white, non-Hispanic voting age residents 
registered to vote in 2004, only 57.4 percent 
of black voting age residents registered, a 
14.2-point difference. U.S. Census Bureau, 
Reported Voting and Registration of the 
Total Voting-Age Population, at tb1.4a. 
Also, although the number of African 
Americans holding elected office had 
increased significantly, they continued to 
face barriers to election for statewide 
positions. Congress found that not one 
African American had yet been elected to 
statewide office in Mississippi, Louisiana, or 
South Carolina .... 
Congress considered other types of evidence 
that, in its judgment, "show[ ed] that 
attempts to discriminate persist and evolve, 
such that Section 5 is still needed to protect 
minority voters in the future." ld. at 21. It 
heard accounts of specific instances of racial 
discrimination in voting. It heard analysis 
and opinions by experts on all sides of the 
issue. It considered, among other things, six 
distinct categories of evidence: (1) Attorney 
General objections issued to block proposed 
voting changes that would, in the Attorney 
General's judgment, have the purpose or 
effect of discriminating against minorities; 
(2) "more information requests" issued 
when the Attorney General believes that the 
information submitted by a covered 
jurisdiction is insufficient to allow a 
preclearance determination; (3) successful 
lawsuits brought under section 2 of the Act; 
(4) federal observers dispatched to monitor 
elections under section 8 of the Act; (5) 
successful section 5 enforcement actions 
filed against covered jurisdictions for failing 
to submit voting changes for preclearance, 
as well as requests for preclearance denied 
by the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia; and (6) evidence that 
the mere existence of section 5 deters 
officials from even proposing discriminatory 
voting changes. Finally, Congress heard 
evidence that case-by-case section 2 
litigation was inadequate to remedy the 
racial discrimination in voting that persisted 
in covered jurisdictions. 
Before delving into the legislative record 
ourselves, we consider two arguments raised 
by Shelby County that, if meritorious, would 
significantly affect how we evaluate that 
record. First, Shelby County argues that 
section 5 can be sustained only on the basis 
of current evidence of "a widespread pattern 
of electoral gamesmanship showing 
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systematic resistance to the Fifteenth 
Amendment." Appellant's Br. 23. 
According to the County, the preclearance 
remedy may qualify as congruent and 
proportional only "when it addresses a 
coordinated campaign of discrimination 
intended to circumvent the remedial effects 
of direct enforcement of Fifteenth 
Amendment voting rights." Id. at 7. We 
disagree .... Shelby County's argument 
rests on a misreading of Katzenbach. 
Although the COUli did describe the 
situation in 1965 as one of "unremitting and 
ingenious defiance of the Constitution," 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309, nothing in 
Katzenbach suggests that such 
gamesmanship was necessary to the Court's 
judgment that section 5 was constitutional. 
Rather, the critical factor was that "Congress 
had found that case-by-case litigation was 
inadequate to combat widespread and 
persistent discrimination in voting." Id. at 
328; see also id. at 313-15 .... 
Second, Shelby County urges us to disregard 
much of the evidence Congress considered 
because it involves "vote dilution, going to 
the weight of the vote once cast, not access 
to the ballot." Appellant's Br. 26 .... 
According to the County, because the 
Supreme Comi has "never held that vote 
dilution violates the Fifteenth Amendment," 
Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 334 n. 3, we may not 
rely on such evidence to sustain section 5 as 
a valid exercise of Congress's Fifteenth 
Amendment enforcement power. 
It is true that neither the Supreme Court nor 
this court has ever held that intentional vote 
dilution violates the Fifteenth Amendment. 
But the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 
vote dilution intended "invidiously to 
minimize or cancel out the voting potential 
of racial or ethnic minorities." City of 
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980). 
Although the Court's previous decisions 
upholding section 5 focused on Congress's 
power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, 
the same "congruent and proportional" 
standard, refined by the inquiries set forth in 
Northwest A1Istin, appears to apply 
"irrespective of whether Section 5 is 
considered [Fifteenth Amendment] 
enforcement legislation, [FoUlieenth 
Amendment] enforcement legislation, or a 
kind of hybrid legislation enacted pursuant 
to both amendments." Shelby Cnty., 811 
F.Supp.2d at 462. Indeed, when 
reauthorizing the Act in 2006, Congress 
expressly invoked its enforcement authority 
under both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments. See H.R.Rep. No. 109-478, at 
90; id. at 53 & n. 136, 100 S.Ct. 1490. 
Accordingly, like Congress and the district 
comi, we think it appropriate to consider 
evidence of unconstitutional vote dilution in 
evaluating section 5's validity. See City of 
Rome, 446 U.S. at 181. 
Having resolved these threshold issues, we 
return to the basic question: Does the 
legislative record contain sufficient 
probative evidence from which Congress 
could reasonably conclude that racial 
discrimination in voting in covered 
jurisdictions is so serious and pervasive that 
section 2 litigation remains an inadequate 
remedy? Reviewing the record ourselves 
and focusing on the evidence most probative 
of ongoing constitutional violations, we 
believe it does. 
To begin with, the record contains numerous 
"examples of modern instances" of racial 
discrimination in voting, City of Boerne, 521 
U.S. at 530. Just a few recent examples: 
• Kilmichael, Mississippi's abrupt 
2001 decision to cancel an election 
when "an unprecedented number" of 
African Americans ran for office, 
H.R.Rep. No. 109-478, at 36-37; 
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• Webster County, Georgia's 1998 
proposal to reduce the black 
population in three of the education 
board's five single-member districts 
after the school district elected a 
majority black school board for the 
first time, Voting Rights Act: 
Hearing Before Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the House Judiciary 
Comm., 109th Congo 830-31 (2006); 
The legislative record also contains 
examples of overt hostility to black voting 
power by those who control the electoral 
process .... In addition to these examples of 
flagrant racial discrimination, several 
categories of evidence in the record support 
Congress's conclusion that intentional racial 
discrimination in voting remains so serious 
and widespread in covered jurisdictions that 
section 5 preclearance is still needed. We 
explore each in turn. 
First, Congress documented hundreds of 
instances in which the Attorney General, 
acting pursuant to section 5, objected to 
proposed voting changes that he found 
would have a discriminatory purpose or 
effect. Significantly, Congress found that the 
absolute number of objections has not 
declined since the 1982 reauthorization: the 
Attorney General interposed at least 626 
objections during the twenty-two years from 
1982 to 2004 (an average of28.5 each year), 
compared to 490 interposed during the 
seventeen years from 1965 to 1982 (an 
average of 28.8 each year). Evidence of 
Continued Need 172. 
Formal objections were not the only way the 
Attorney General blocked potentially 
discriminatory changes under section 5. 
Congress found that between 1990 and 
2005, "more information requests" (MIRs) 
prompted covered jurisdictions to withdraw 
or modify over 800 proposed voting 
changes. . . . Congress found that because 
"[t]he actions taken by a jurisdiction [in 
response to an MIR] are often illustrative of 
[its] motives," the high number of 
withdrawals and modifications made in 
response to MIRs constitutes additional 
evidence of "[ e ]ff011s to discriminate over 
the past 25 years." H.R.Rep. No. 109-478, 
at 40-41. 
Shelby County contends that section 5 
objections and MIRs, however numerous, 
"do[ ] not signal intentional voting 
discrimination" because they represent only 
the Attorney General's opinion and need not 
be based on discriminatory intent. 
Appellant's Br. 30-31. Underlying this 
argument is a fundamental principle with 
which we agree: to sustain section 5, the 
record must contain "evidence of a pattern 
of constitutional violations," Hibbs, 538 
U.S. at 729, and voting changes violate the 
constitution only if motivated by 
discriminatory animus, Reno v. Bossier 
Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 481 (1997) 
("Bossier I "). Although not all objections 
rest on an affirmative finding of intentional 
discrimination, the record contains examples 
of many that do. See Nw. Austin, 573 
F.Supp.2d at 289-301. ... Moreover, in the 
1990s, before the Supreme Court limited the 
Attorney General's ability to object based on 
discriminatory but non-retrogressive intent, 
see Bossier 11, 528 U.S. 320, "the purpose 
prong of Section 5 had become the dominant 
legal basis for objections," Preclearance 
Standards 177 .... 
Shelby County also points out that the 
percentage of proposed voting changes 
blocked by Attorney General objections has 
steadily declined. An Introduction to the 
Expiring Provisions of the Voting Rights Act 
and Legal Issues Relating to 
Reauthorization: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the J1Idiciary, 109th Congo 219 
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(2006). But the most dramatic decline in the 
objection rate-which, as the district court 
observed, "has always been low," Shelby 
Cnty., 811 F.Supp.2d at 470-occurred in 
the 1970s, before the Supreme Court upheld 
the Act for a third time in City of Rome. See 
Introd1lction to the Expiring Provisions 219. 
. . . As the district court pointed out, there 
may be "many plausible explanations for the 
recent decline in objection rates." See Shelby 
Cnty., 811 F.Supp.2dat471. ... 
As for MIRs, we agree with Shelby County 
that they are less probative of discrimination 
than objections. An MIR does not represent 
a judgment on the merits, and submitting 
jurisdictions might have many reasons for 
modifying or withdrawing a proposed 
change in response to one. But the record 
contains evidence from which Congress 
could "reasonabl[y] infer[ ]," id., that at least 
some withdrawals or modifications reflect 
the submitting jurisdiction's 
acknowledgement that the proposed change 
was discriminatory. See Evidence of 
Continlled Need 178, 809-10; H.R.Rep. No. 
lO9-478, at 41. Given this, Congress 
reasonably concluded that some of the 800-
plus withdrawals and modifications in 
response to MIRs "reflect[ ]" "[ e ]fforts to 
discriminate over the past 25 years." 
H.R.Rep. No. 109-478, at 40. 
The second category of evidence relied on 
by Congress, successful section 2 litigation, 
reinforces the pattern of discrimination 
revealed by objections and MIRs. The 
record shows that between 1982 and 2005, 
minority plaintiffs obtained favorable 
outcomes in some 653 section 2 suits filed in 
covered jurisdictions, providing relief from 
discriminatory voting practices in at least 
825 counties. Evidence of Continued Need 
208, 251. Shelby County faults the district 
court for relying on evidence of successful 
section 2 litigation "even though 'a violation 
of Section 2 does not require a showing of 
unconstitutional discriminatory intent. ", 
Appellant's Br. 34. The County's premise is 
correct: although the Constitution prohibits 
only those voting laws motivated by 
discriminatory intent, section 2 prohibits all 
voting laws for which "'based on the totality 
of circumstances, it is shown that the 
political processes leading to nomination or 
election in the State or political subdivision 
are not equally open to participation by 
members of a [protected] class. ", Bartlett v. 
Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 10-11 (2009). In 
practice, however, this "results test," as 
applied in section 2 cases, requires 
consideration of factors very similar to those 
used to establish discriminatory intent based 
on circumstantial evidence. Compare 
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36, with Rogers v. 
Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982). Also, as the 
district cOUli pointed out, "coutiS will avoid 
deciding constitutional questions" if, as is 
the case in virtually all successful section 2 
actions, the litigation can be resolved on 
narrower grounds. Shelby Cnty., 811 
F.Supp.2d at 482. This explains why the 
legislative record contains so few published 
section 2 cases with judicial findings of 
discriminatory intent, see Dissenting Op. at 
26;)-courts have no need to find 
discriminatory intent once they find 
discriminatory effect. But Congress is not so 
limited. Considering the evidence required 
to prevail in a section 2 case and accounting 
for the obligation of Article III courts to 
avoid reaching constitutional questions 
unless necessary, we think Congress quite 
reasonably concluded that successful section 
2 suits provide powerful evidence of 
unconstitutional discrimination. In addition, 
as with Attorney General objections, we 
cannot ignore the sheer number of 
successful section 2 cases. This high volume 
of successful section 2 actions is particularly 
dramatic given that Attorney General 
objections block discriminatory laws before 
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they can be implemented and that section 5 
deters jurisdictions from even attempting to 
enact such laws, thereby reducing the need 
for section 2 litigation in covered 
jurisdictions. See Continlling Need 26. 
Third, Congress relied on evidence of "the 
tens of thousands of Federal observers that 
have been dispatched to observe elections in 
covered jurisdictions." 2006 Act § 2(b)( 5) .. 
Of these, sixty-six percent were 
concentrated in five of the six states 
originally covered by section 5-Alabama, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South 
Carolina. H.R.Rep. No. 109--478, at 44. In 
some instances, monitoring by federal 
observers "bec[ arne] the foundation of 
Department of Justice enforcement efforts." 
Jd. As Congress saw it, this continued need 
for federal observers in covered jurisdictions 
IS indicative of discrimination and 
"demonstrates that the discriminatory 
conduct experienced by minority voters is 
not solely limited to tactics to dilute the 
voting strength of minorities but continues 
to include tactics to disenfranchise, such as 
harassment and intimidation inside polling 
locations." H.R.Rep. No.1 09--478, at 44. 
. . . The record shows that federal observers 
in fact witnessed discrimination at the polls, 
sometimes in the form of intentional 
harassment, intimidation, or disparate 
treatment of minority voters. See id. at 30-
31, 34, 43. Thus, although the deployment 
of federal observers is hardly conclusive 
evidence of unconstitutional discrimination, 
we think Congress could reasonably rely 
upon it as modest, additional evidence of 
CUlTent needs. 
Fourth, Congress found evidence of 
continued discrimination in two types of 
preclearance-related lawsuits. Examining the 
first of these-actions brought to enforce 
secti on 5' s preclearance requirement-
Congress noted that "many defiant covered 
jurisdictions and State and local officials 
continue to enact and enforce changes to 
voting procedures without the Federal 
Government's knowledge." H.R.Rep. No. 
109--478, at 41. ... 
Congress could reasonably have concluded 
that such cases, even if few in number, 
provide at least some evidence of continued 
willingness to evade the Fifteenth 
Amendment's protections, for they reveal 
continued effOlis by recalcitrant jurisdictions 
not only to enact discriminatory voting 
changes, but to do so in defiance of section 
5' s preclearance requirement. 
In addition to section 5 enforcement suits, 
Congress found evidence of continued 
discrimination in "the number of requests 
for declaratory judgments [for preclearance] 
denied by the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia." 2006 Act § 
2(b)(4)(B). The number of unsuccessful 
judicial preclearance actions appears to have 
remained roughly constant since 1966: 
twenty-five requests were denied or 
withdrawn between 1982 and 2004, 
compared to seventeen between 1966 and 
1982. Evidence of Continlled Need 177-78, 
275. Shelby County does not contest the 
relevance of this evidence. 
Finally, and bolstering its conclusion that 
section 5 remains necessary, Congress 
"f[ ound] that the existence of Section 5 
deterred covered jurisdictions from even 
attempting to enact discriminatory voting 
changes." H.R.Rep. No. 109--478, at 24. In 
Congress's view, "Section 5's strong 
deterrent effect" and "the number of voting 
changes that have never gone forward as a 
result of [that effect]" are "[a]s important as 
the number of objections that have been 
interposed to protect minority voters against 
discriminatory changes" that had actually 
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been proposed. Id. As Congress explained, 
'" [0 ]nce officials in covered jurisdictions 
become aware of the logic of preclearance, 
they tend to understand that submitting 
discriminatory changes is a waste of 
taxpayer time and money and interferes with 
their own timetables, because the chances 
are good that an objection will result. '" Id. 
For this reason, the mere existence of 
section 5 "encourage[ s] the legislature to 
ensure that any voting changes would not 
have a discriminatory effect on minority 
voters, and that it would not become 
embroiled in the preclearance process." Id. . 
.. Congress had "some reason to believe that 
without [section 5' s] deterrent effect on 
potential misconduct," the evidence of 
continued discrimination m covered 
jurisdictions "might be considerably worse." 
S.Rep. No.1 09-295, at 11. 
Shelby County argues that Congress's 
finding of deterrence reflects '''outdated 
assumptions about racial attitudes in the 
covered jurisdictions '" that we should not 
"indulge[ ]''' Appellant's Br. 38 (Thomas, 1., 
concurrmg in judgment in part and 
dissenting in part)). We agree that 
evaluating section 5 's deterrent effect raises 
sensitive and difficult issues .... We also 
agree with the dissent that section 5 could 
not stand based on claims of deterrence 
alone, nor could deterrence be used in some 
hypothetical case to justify renewal "to the 
crack of doom," id. But the difficulty of 
quantifying the statute's deterrent effect is 
no reason to summarily reject Congress's 
finding that the evidence of racial 
discrimination in voting would look worse 
without section 5-a finding that flows from 
record evidence unchallenged by the dissent. 
As explained above, Congress's deterrent 
effect finding rests on evidence of current 
and widespread voting discrimination, as 
well as on testimony indicating that section 
5's mere existence prompts state and local 
legislators to conform their conduct to the 
law. And Congress's finding-that is, a 
finding about how the world would have 
looked absent section 5-rests on precisely 
the type of fact-based, predictive judgment 
that courts are ill-equipped to second guess. 
See Turner Broad., 520 U.S. at 195. 
This brings us, then, to Congress's ultimate 
conclusion. After considering the entire 
record, including 
• 626 Attorney General objections that 
blocked discriminatory voting 
changes; 
• 653 successful section 2 cases; 
• over 800 proposed voting changes 
withdrawn or modified in response 
to MIRs; 
• tens of thousands of observers sent to 
covered jurisdictions; 
105 successful section 5 enforcement 
actions; 
25 unsuccessful judicial preclearance 
actions; 
• and section 5' s strong deterrent 
effect, i.e., "the number of voting 
changes that have never gone 
forward as a result of Section 5," 
H.R.Rep. No. 109-478, at 24; 
Congress found that serious and widespread 
intentional discrimination persisted in 
covered jurisdictions and that "case-by-case 
enforcement alone ... would leave minority 
citizens with [an] inadequate remedy." Id. at 
57. In reaching this conclusion, Congress 
considered evidence that section 2 claims 
involve "intensely complex litigation that is 
both costly and time-consuming." Modern 
Enforcement 96; see also Introd1lction to the 
Expiring Provisions; City of Boerne, 521 
U.S at 526. It heard from witnesses who 
explained that "it is incredibly difficult for 
minority voters to pull together the resources 
needed" to pursue a section 2 lawsuit, 
87 
particularly at the local level and in rural 
communities. Modern Enforcement 96; see 
also History, Scope, and P1lrpose 84. . . . 
Given all of this, and given the magnitude 
and persistence of discrimination in covered 
jurisdictions, Congress concluded that case-
by-case litigation-slow, costly, and lacking 
section 5's prophylactic effect-"would be 
ineffective to protect the rights of minority 
voters." H.R.Rep. No. 109-478, at 57. 
According to Shelby County, "[ e ]valuation 
of the probative evidence shows there is no 
longer systematic resistance to the Fifteenth 
Amendment in the covered jurisdictions that 
cannot be solved through case-by-case 
litigation." Appellant's Br. 38. Congress, 
however, reached a different conclusion, and 
as explained above, the County has offered 
no basis for thinking that Congress's 
judgment is either unreasonable or 
unsupported by probative evidence .... 
The point at which section 5's strong 
medicine becomes unnecessary and 
therefore no longer congruent and 
proportional turns on several critical 
considerations, including the pervasiveness 
of serious racial discrimination in voting in 
covered jurisdictions; the continued need for 
section 5's deterrent and blocking effect; 
and the adequacy of section 2 litigation. 
These are quintessentially legislative 
judgments, and Congress, after assembling 
and analyzing an extensive record, made its 
decision: section 5's work is not yet done. 
Insofar as Congress's conclusions rest on 
predictive judgments, we must, contrary to 
the dissent's approach, apply a standard of 
review even "more deferential than we 
accord to judgments of an administrative 
agency." T1lrner Broad., 520 U.S. at 195. 
Given that we may not "displace [an 
agency's] choice between two fairly 
conflicting views, even though the court 
would justifiably have made a different 
choice had the matter been before it de 
novo," Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 
340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951), we certainly 
cannot do so here. Of course, given the 
heavy federalism costs that section 5 
imposes, our job is to ensure that Congress's 
judgment is reasonable and rests on 
substantial probative evidence. See T1lrner 
Broad., 520 U.S. at 195. After thoroughly 
scrutinizing the record and given that overt 
racial discrimination persists in covered 
jurisdictions notwithstanding decades of 
section 5 preclearance, we, like the district 
court, are satisfied that Congress's judgment 
deserves judicial deference. 
B. 
Having concluded that section 5's "current 
burdens" are indeed justified by "current 
needs," we proceed to the second Northwest 
A1Istin inquiry: whether the record supports 
the requisite "showing that a statute's 
disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently 
related to the problem that it targets." 129 
S.Ct. at 2512. Recall that this requirement 
stems from the Court's concern that "[t]he 
Act . . . differentiates between the States, 
despite our historic tradition that all the 
States enjoy 'equal sovereignty.'" ld. "The 
evil that § 5 is meant to address," the Court 
observed, "may no longer be concentrated in 
the jurisdictions singled out [by section 4(b)] 
for preclearance." ld. 
Before examining the record ourselves, we 
emphasize that the Act's disparate 
geographic coverage-and its relation to the 
problem of voting discrimination-depends 
not only on section 4(b)'s formula, but on 
the statute as a whole, including its 
mechanisms for bail-in and bailout. . . . 
[T]he question before us is whether the 
statute as a whole, not just the section 4(b) 
formula, ensures that jurisdictions subject to 
section 5 are those in which unconstitutional 
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voting discrimination is concentrated. 
The most concrete evidence comparing 
covered and non-covered jurisdictions in the 
legislative record comes from a study of 
section 2 cases published on Westlaw or 
Lexis between 1982 and 2004. Impact and 
Effectiveness 964-1124 (report by Ellen 
Katz et al.). Known as the Katz study, it 
reached two key findings suggesting that 
racial discrimination in voting remains 
"concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out 
for preclearance," Nw. Austin, 129 S.Ct. at 
2512. First, the study found that of the 114 
published decisions resulting in outcomes 
favorable to minority plaintiffs, 64 
originated in covered jurisdictions, while 
only 50 originated in non-covered 
jurisdictions. . . . Second, the study found 
higher success rates in covered jurisdictions 
than in non-covered jurisdictions. Impact 
and Effectiveness 974. 
The difference between covered and non-
covered jurisdictions becomes even more 
pronounced when unpublished section 2 
decisions-primarily court-approved 
settlements-are taken into account. As the 
Katz study noted, published section 2 
lawsuits "represent only a portion of the 
section 2 claims filed or decided since 1982" 
since many claims were settled or otherwise 
resolved without a published opinion. Id. at 
974 .... 
The section 2 data, moreover, does not tell 
the whole story. As explained above, 
Congress found that section 5, which 
operates only in covered jurisdictions, deters 
or blocks many discriminatory voting laws 
before they can ever take effect and become 
the target of section 2 litigation. "Section 5's 
reach in preventing discrimination is broad. 
Its strength lies not only in the number of 
discriminatory voting changes it has 
thwarted, but can also be measured by the 
submissions that have been withdrawn from 
consideration, the submissions that have 
been altered by jurisdictions in order to 
comply with the [Voting Rights Act], or in 
the discriminatory voting changes that have 
never materialized." H.R. Rep. No. 109-
478, at 36. Accordingly, if discrimination 
were evenly distributed throughout the 
nation, we would expect to see fewer 
successful section 2 cases in covered 
jurisdictions than in non-covered 
jurisdictions. See Continuing Need 26. Yet 
we see substantially more .... 
Of course, Shelby County's real argument is 
that the statute fails this test, i.e., that it no 
longer actually identifies the jurisdictions 
"uniquely interfering with the right 
Congress is seeking to protect through 
preclearance." Appellant's Br. 62 .... 
Shelby County's first point-that Congress 
failed to make a finding-is easily 
answered. Congress did not have to. United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995). 
The proper question is whether the record 
contains sufficient evidence to demonstrate 
that the formula continues to target 
jurisdictions with the most serious problems. 
See Nw. Austin, 129 S.Ct. at 2512. This 
presents a close question. The record on this 
issue is less robust than the evidence of 
continued discrimination, see supra Part 
IILA, although this is in part due to the 
difficulty of comparing jurisdictions that 
have been subject to two very different 
enforcement regimes, i.e., covered 
jurisdictions are subject to both sections 2 
and 5 while non-covered jurisdictions are 
subject only to section 2. And although the 
Katz data in the aggregate does suggest that 
discrimination is concentrated in covered 
jurisdictions, just three covered states-
Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi-
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account for much of the disparity .... 
[H]owever, this data presents an incomplete 
picture of covered jurisdictions. When we 
consider the Katz data in conjunction with 
other record evidence, the picture looks 
quite different. . [E]ven if only a 
relatively small portion of objections, 
withdrawn voting changes, and successful 
section 5 enforcement actions correspond to 
unconstitutional conduct, and even if there 
are substantially more successful 
unpublished section 2 cases in non-covered 
jurisdictions than the McCrary data reveals, 
these middle-range covered jurisdictions 
appear to be engaged in much more 
unconstitutional discrimination compared to 
non-covered jurisdictions than the Katz data 
alone suggests. In fact, the discrepancy 
between covered and non-covered 
jurisdictions is likely even greater given 
that, as Congress found, the mere existence 
of section 5 deters unconstitutional behavior 
in the covered jurisdictions .... 
To be sure, the coverage formula's fit is not 
perfect. But the fit was hardly perfect in 
1965. Accordingly, Katzenbach's discussion 
of this issue offers a helpful guide for our 
current inquiry, particularly when we 
consider all probative record evidence of 
recent discrimination-and not just the 
small subset of section 2 cases relied upon 
by the dissent, see Dissenting Op. at 898-99. 
In 1965, the formula covered three states in 
"which federal courts ha[ d] repeatedly found 
substantial voting discrimination"-
Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi, 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 329, the same three 
states that, notwithstanding more than fOlty 
years of section 5 enforcement, still account 
for the highest rates of published successful 
section 2 litigation, as well as large numbers 
of unpublished successful section 2 cases, 
section 5 objections, federal observer 
coverages, and voting changes withdrawn or 
modified in response to MIRs. But the 1965 
formula also "embrace[ d] two other States-
Georgia and South Carolina-plus large 
portions of a third State-North Carolina-
for which there was more fragmentary 
evidence of recent voting discrimination 
mainly adduced by the Justice Depmtment 
and the Civil Rights Commission." Jd. at 
329-30. Today, the middle-range covered 
jurisdictions-NOlth Carolina, South 
Carolina, Virginia, Texas, and Georgia-
look similar: although the legislative record 
contains fewer judicial findings of racial 
discrimination in these states, it contains at 
least fragmentary evidence, in part based on 
Attorney General objections, that these 
states continue to engage in unconstitutional 
racial discrimination in voting. Finally, the 
1965 formula swept in several other 
jurisdictions-including Alaska, Virginia, 
and counties in Arizona, Hawaii, and 
Idaho-for which Congress apparently had 
no evidence of actual voting discrimination. 
See id. at 318. Today, the Act likewise 
encompasses jurisdictions for which there is 
some evidence of continued 
discrimination-Arizona and the covered 
counties of California, Florida, and New 
York, see Evidence of Continlled Need 250-
51, 272-as well as jurisdictions for which 
there appears little or no evidence of current 
problems-Alaska and a few towns in 
Michigan and New Hampshire. 
Critically, moreover, and as noted above, in 
determining whether section 5 is 
"sufficiently related to the problem that it 
targets," we look not just at the section 4(b) 
formula, but at the statute as a whole, 
including its provisions for bail-in and 
bailout. Bail-in allows jurisdictions not 
captured by section 4's coverage formula, 
but which nonetheless discriminate in 
voting, to be subjected to section 5 
preclearance. Thus, two non-covered states 
with high numbers of successful published 
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and unpublished section 2 cases-Arkansas 
and New Mexico--were subjected to partial 
preclearance under the bail-in provision. See 
Jeffers, 740 F.Supp. at 601; Crum, 119 Yale 
LJ. at 2010. Federal courts have also bailed 
in jurisdictions in several states. See Crum, 
119 Yale L.J. at 2010 & nn.102-08. 
Bailout plays an even more important role in 
ensuring that section 5 covers only those 
jurisdictions with the worst records of racial 
discrimination in voting. As the Supreme 
COUli explained in City of Boerne, the 
availability of bailout "reduce[ s] the 
possibility of overbreadth" and helps 
"ensure Congress' means are propOliionate 
to [its] ends." 521 U.S. at 533. As of May 9, 
2012, having demonstrated that they no 
longer discriminate in voting, 136 
jurisdictions and sub-jurisdictions had bailed 
out, including 30 counties, 79 towns and 
cities, 21 school boards, and 6 utility or 
sanitary districts. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 
Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act. In fact, 
by ruling in Northwest A1Istin that any 
jurisdiction covered by section 5 could seek 
bailout-a development unmentioned by the 
dissent-the Supreme Court increased 
significantly the extent to which bailout 
helps "ensure Congress' means are 
propOliionate to [its] ends," Boerne, 521 
U.S. at 533. Not surprisingly, then, the pace 
of bailout increased after Northwest A1Istin: 
of the successful bailout actions since 1965, 
30 percent occurred in the three years after 
the Supreme Court issued its decision in 
2009. See DOJ Bailout List. Also, the 
Attorney General "has a number of active 
bailout investigations, encompassing more 
than 100 jurisdictions and subjurisdictions 
from a range of States." Br. for Att'y Gen. 
as Appellee at 47-48, LaRoq1le v. Holder, 
679 F.3d 905 (D.C.Cir.2012) .... The 
importance of this significantly liberalized 
bailout mechanism cannot be overstated. 
Underlying the debate over the continued 
need for section 5 is a judgment about when 
covered jurisdictions-many with very bad 
historic records of racial discrimination in 
voting-have changed enough so that case-
by-case section 2 litigation is adequate to 
protect the right to vote. Bailout embodies 
Congress's judgment on this question: 
jurisdictions originally covered because of 
their histories of discrimination can escape 
section 5 preclearance by demonstrating a 
clean record on voting rights for ten years in 
a row. See 42 U.S.c. § 1973b(a)(1). As the 
House Report states, "covered status has 
been and continues to be within the control 
of the jurisdiction such that those 
jurisdictions that have a genuinely clean 
record and want to terminate coverage have 
the ability to do so." H.R.Rep. No.1 09-478, 
at 25. Bailout thus helps to ensure that 
section 5 is "sufficiently related to the 
problem that it targets," Nw. A1Istin, 129 
S.Ct. at 2512. 
This, then, brings us to the critical question: 
Is the statute's "disparate geographic 
coverage . . . sufficiently related to the 
problem that it targets"? Nw. A1Istin, 129 
S.Ct. at 2512. Of course, if the statute 
produced "a remarkably bad fit," Dissenting 
Op. at 898-99, then we would agree that it is 
no longer congruent and proportional. But as 
explained above, although the section 4(b) 
formula relies on old data, the legislative 
record shows that it, together with the 
statute's provisions for bail-in and bailout-
hardly "tack[ ed] on," id. at 901 (internal 
quotation marks omitted), but rather an 
integral pati of the coverage mechanism-
continues to single out the jurisdictions in 
which discrimination is concentrated. Given 
this, and given the fundamental principle 
that we may not "strik[ e] down an Act of 
Congress except upon a clear showing of 
unconstitutionality," Salazar v. Buono, 130 
S.Ct. 1803 (2010) (plurality opinion), we see 
no principled basis for setting aside the 
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district court's conclusion that section 5 is 
"sufficiently related to the problem that it 
targets," Nw. A1Istin, 129 S.Ct. at2512 .... 
IV. 
In Northwest A1Istin, the Supreme Court 
signaled that the extraordinary federalism 
costs imposed by section 5 raise substantial 
constitutional concerns. As a lower federal 
court urged to strike this duly enacted law of 
Congress, we must proceed with great 
caution, bound as we are by Supreme Court 
precedent and confined as we must be to 
resolve only the precise legal question 
before us: Does the severe remedy of 
preclearance remain "congruent and 
proportional"? The legislative record is by 
no means unambiguous. But Congress drew 
reasonable conclusions from the extensive 
evidence it gathered and acted pursuant to 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, 
which entrust Congress with ensuring that 
the right to vote-surely among the most 
important guarantees of political liberty in 
the Constitution-is not abridged on account 
of race. In this context, we owe much 
deference to the considered judgment of the 
People's elected representatives. We affirm. 
So ordered. 
WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, 
dissenting: 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act imposes 
rather extraordinary burdens on "covered" 
jurisdictions-nine states (and every 
jurisdiction therein), plus a host of 
jurisdictions scattered through several other 
states. See Voting Section, U.S. Dep't of 
Justice, Section 5 Covered Jurisdictions. 
Unless and until released from coverage (a 
process discussed below), each of these 
jurisdictions must seek the Justice 
Department's approval for every 
contemplated change in election procedures, 
however trivial. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. 
Alternatively, it can seek approval from a 
three-judge district court in the District of 
Columbia. See id. Below I'll address the 
criteria by which the Department and courts 
assess these proposals; for now, suffice it to 
say that the act not only switches the burden 
of proof to the supplicant jurisdiction, but 
also applies substantive standards quite 
different from those governing the rest of 
the nation. 
Section 4(b) of the act states two criteria by 
which jurisdictions are chosen for this 
special treatment: whether a jurisdiction had 
(1) a "test or device" restricting the 
opportunity to register or vote and (2) a 
voter registration or turnout rate below 50%. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b). But § 4(b) 
specifies that the elections for which these 
two criteria are measured must be ones that 
took place several decades ago. The 
freshest, most recent data relate to 
conditions in November 1972-34 years 
before Congress extended the act for another 
25 years (and thus 59 years before the 
extension's scheduled expiration). See id. 
The oldest data-and a jurisdiction included 
because of the oldest data is every bit as 
covered as one condemned under the 
newest-are another eight years older. See 
id. 
Of course sometimes a skilled dart-thrower 
can hit the bull's eye throwing a dart 
backwards over his shoulder. As I will try to 
show below, Congress hasn't proven so 
adept. Whether the criteria are viewed in 
absolute terms (are they adequate in 
themselves to justify the extraordinary 
burdens of § 5?) or in relative ones (do they 
draw a rational line between covered and 
uncovered jurisdictions?), they seem to me 
defective. They are not, in my view, 
"congruent and proportional," as required by 
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controlling Supreme Court precedent. My 
colleagues find they are. I dissent. 
* * * 
Although it is only the irrational coverage 
formula of § 4(b) that I find 
unconstitutional, it is impossible to assess 
that formula without first looking at the 
burdens § 5 imposes on covered 
jurisdictions. Any answer to the question 
whether § 4(b) is "sufficiently related to the 
problem it targets," Northwest A1Istin 
Municipal Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder, 
557 U.S. 193 (2009), that is, whether it is 
"congruent and proportional," must be 
informed by the consequences triggered by § 
4(b) .... 
[Section] 5 requires much more than notice. 
For covered jurisdictions, it mandates 
anticipatory review of state legislative or 
administrative acts, requiring state and local 
officials to go hat in hand to Justice 
Department officialdom to seek approval of 
any and all proposed voting changes. See 42 
U.S.c. § 1973c(a). When it first upheld the 
VRA, the Supreme Court recognized it as a 
"complex scheme of stringent remedies" and 
§ 5 in particular as an "uncommon exercise 
of congressional power." South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966). And 
only a few years ago the Supreme Court 
reminded us that the federalism costs of § 5 
are "substantial." Northwest Austin, 129 
S.Ct. at 2511. 
A critical aspect of those costs is the shifted 
burden of proof (a matter I'll discuss below 
in the realm of its most significant 
application). So too is the section's broad 
sweep: § 5 applies to any voting change 
proposed by a covered jurisdiction, without 
regard to kind or magnitude, and thus 
governs many laws that likely could never 
"deny or abridge" a "minority group's 
opportunity to vote." See 42 U.S.c. § 
1973c(a); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 
U.S. 544 (1969) .... In the vast majority of 
cases, then, the overall effect of § 5 is 
merely to delay implementation of a 
perfectly proper law. 
Of course the most critical features of § 5 
are the substantive standards it applies to the 
covered jurisdictions. In practice this 
standard requires a jurisdiction not only to 
engage in some level of race-conscious 
decision-making, but also on occasion to 
sacrifice principles aimed at depoliticizing 
redistricting .... 
[In 2006,] New subsections (b) and (d) were 
added to § 5 to overturn Georgia v. Ashcroft, 
thereby restricting the flexibility of states to 
experiment with different methods of 
maintaining (and perhaps even expanding) 
minority influence .... 
Preclearance now has an exclusive focus-
whether the plan diminishes the ability of 
minorities (always assumed to be a 
monolith) to "elect their preferred 
candidates of choice," irrespective of 
whether policymakers (including minority 
ones) decide that a group's long-term 
interests might be better served by less 
concentration-and thus less of the political 
isolation that concentration spawns. See 42 
U.S.c. § 1973c(b); td. § 1973c(d). The 
amended § 5 thus not only mandates race-
conscious decisionmaking, but a paIiicular 
brand of it. In doing so, the new § 5 
aggravates both the federal-state tension 
with which Northwest A1lstin was concerned 
and the tension between § 5 and the 
Reconstruction Amendments' commitment 
to nondiscrimination. 
Another 2006 amendment makes the § 5 
burden even heavier. Section 5 prohibits 
preclearance of laws that have the "purpose" 
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of "denying or abridging the right to vote on 
account of race or color." 42 U.S.c. § 
1973c(a). The Court had interpreted 
"purpose" to be consistent with § 5' s effects 
prong, so that the term justified denying 
preclearance only to changes with a 
"retrogressive" purpose, rather than changes 
with either that or a discriminatory purpose. 
See Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 528 
u.s. 320, 341 (2000) ("Bossier 11"). The 
2006 amendments reversed that decision, 
specifying that "purpose" encompassed "any 
discriminatory purpose." 42 U.S.c. § 
1973c( c). This broadening of the § 5 criteria 
may seem unexceptionable, but the Court 
had previously found that assigning covered 
jurisdictions the burden of proving the 
absence of discriminatory purpose was 
precisely the device that the Department had 
employed in its pursuit of maximizing 
majority-minority districts at any cost: "The 
key to the Government's position, which is 
plain from its objection letters if not from its 
briefs to this cOUli . . . , is and always has 
been that Georgia failed to proffer a 
nondiscriminatory purpose for its refusal in 
the first two submissions to take the steps 
necessary to create [an additional] majority-
minority district." Miller, 515 U.S. at 924. 
By inseliing discriminatory purpose into § 5, 
and requmng covered jurisdictions 
affirmatively to prove its absence, Congress 
appears to have, at worst, restored "the 
Justice Department's implicit command that 
States engage in presumptively 
unconstitutional race-based districting," id. 
at 927, and at best, "exacerbate[d] the 
substantial federalism costs that the 
preclearance procedure already exacts," 
Bossier 11, 528 U.S. at 336 .... 
Whether Congress is free to impose § 5 on a 
select set of jurisdictions also depends in 
part, of course, on possible shortcomings in 
the remedy that § 2 provides for the country 
as a whole. That section creates a right to 
sue any jurisdiction to stop voting practices 
that "result[ ] in a denial or abridgement" of 
the right to vote "on account of race or 
color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). Doubtless the 
section is less drastic a remedy than § 5 (and 
thus by some criteria less effective). But it is 
easy to overstate the inadequacies of § 2, 
such as cost and the consequences of delay. 
Compare Maj. Op. at 872 .... So far as 
Departmental resource constraints are 
concerned, narrowing § 5's reach would, as 
a matter of simple arithmetic, enable it to 
increase § 2 enforcement with whatever 
resources it stopped spending on § 5 .... 
Finally, as to the risk that discriminatory 
practices may take hold before traditional 
litigation has run its course, courts may as 
always use the standard remedy of a 
preliminary injunction to prevent irreparable 
harm caused by adjudicative delay. See 
Perry v. Perez, 132 S.Ct. 934,942 (2012). 
Indeed, the ubiquitous availability of § 2 is 
of course a reminder that § 5 was created for 
the specific purpose of overcoming state and 
local resistance to federal antidiscrimination 
policy. When the Supreme Court first 
upheld the act in 1966, it found that § 5 was 
necessary because "case-by-case litigation," 
now governed by § 2, was "inadequate to 
combat the widespread and persistent 
discrimination in voting." Katzenbach, 383 
U.S. at 328. While § 2 was tailored to 
redress actual instances of discrimination, § 
5 was crafted to overcome a "century of 
systematic resistance to the Fifteenth 
Amendment" and ongoing "obstructionist 
tactics." Id. 
But life in the covered jurisdictions has not 
congealed in the 48 years since the first 
triggering election (or the 40 years since the 
most recent). "[C]urrent burdens ... must be 
justified by current needs," Northwest 
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A 1IS tin, 129 S.Ct. at 2512, and the burden 
imposed by § 5 has only grown heavier in 
those same years. 
In order for § 4(b) to be congment and 
proportional then, the disparity in current 
evidence of discrimination between the 
covered and uncovered jurisdictions must be 
proportionate to the severe differential in 
treatment imposed by § 5. Put another way, 
a distinct gap must exist between the current 
levels of discrimination in the covered and 
uncovered jurisdictions in order to justify 
subjecting the former group to § 5's harsh 
remedy, even if one might find § 5 
appropriate for a subset of that group .... 
To recap, of the four metrics for which 
comparative data exist, one (voter 
registration and turnout) suggests that the 
coverage formula completely lacks any 
rational connection to current levels of voter 
discrimination, another (black elected 
officials), at best does nothing to combat 
that suspicion, and, at worst, confirms it, and 
two final metrics (federal observers and § 2 
suits) indicate that the formula, though not 
completely perverse, is a remarkably bad fit 
with Congress's concerns. Given the drastic 
remedy imposed on covered jurisdictions by 
§ 5, as described above, I do not believe that 
such equivocal evidence can sustain the 
scheme. 
The Supreme Court's initial review of the 
formula in 1966 provides a model for 
evaluating such an imperfect correlation. lt 
assessed the evidence of discrimination 
before it and divided the covered 
jurisdictions into three categories: (l) a 
group for which "federal courts have 
repeatedly found substantial voting 
discrimination"; (2) another group "for 
which there was more fragmentary evidence 
of recent voting discrimination"; and (3) a 
third set consisting of the "few remaining 
States and political subdivisions covered by 
the formula," for which there was little or no 
such evidence of discrimination, but whose 
use of voting tests and low voter turnout 
warranted inclusion, "at least in the absence 
of proof that they have been free of 
substantial voting discrimination in recent 
years." Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 329-30. In 
that original review, the Supreme Court 
placed three states (Alabama, Mississippi, 
and Louisiana) in category one, another 
three (Georgia, South Carolina, and the 
covered portions of North Carolina) in 
category two, and finally two fully covered 
states (Virginia and Alaska) plus a few 
counties in Hawaii, Idaho, and Arizona, in 
category three. 
The evidence adduced above yields a far 
worse fit than the data reviewed in 
Katzenbach. Indeed, one would be hard-
pressed to put any of the covered 
jurisdictions into Katzenbach's first 
category. Based on any of the comparative 
data available to us, and particularly those 
metrics relied on in Rome, it can hardly be 
argued that there IS evidence of a 
"substantial" amount of voting 
discrimination in any of the covered states, 
and cel1ainly not at levels anywhere 
comparable to those the Court faced in 
Katzenbach. ... 
All of this suggests that bailout may be only 
the most modest palliative to § 5's burdens. 
One scholar hypothesizes that bailout may 
"exist [ ] more as a fictitious way out of 
coverage than [as] an authentic way of 
shoring up the constitutionality of the 
coverage formula." Persily, S1lpra, at 213. In 
fairness, the same scholar also entertains 
various other explanations, including the 
possibility that the eligible jurisdictions are 
just the ones for whom § 5 poses only a very 
light burden, see id. at 213-14, and 
ultimately concludes that no one knows 
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which theory "best explains the relative 
absence of bailouts," id. at 214. Regardless 
of the reason for the trivial number of 
bailouts, irrational rules-here made so by 
their encompassing six states and numerous 
additional jurisdictions not seriously 
different from the uncovered states-cannot 
be saved "by tacking on a waiver procedure" 
such as bailout. ALLTEL Corp. v. FCC, 838 
F.2d 551, 561 (D.C.Cir.1988). 
Finally the government argues that because 
the VRA is meant to protect the fundamental 
right of racial minorities (i.e., a suspect 
classification), a heightened level of 
deference to Congress is III order. 
Appellees' Br. 22-23. Purportedly 
supporting this proposition is Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's statement in Nevada Dep't of 
Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 
(2003), that when a statute is designed to 
protect a fundamental right or to prevent 
discrimination based on a suspect 
classification, "it [is] easier for Congress to 
show a pattern of state constitutional 
violations." ld. at 736. But the passage 
simply makes the point that where a 
classification is presumptively invalid (e.g., 
race), an inference of ltnlawfitl 
discrimination follows almost automatically 
from rules or acts that differentiate on the 
presumptively forbidden basis, whereas for 
classifications judged under the "rational 
basis" test, such as disability or age, 
"Congress must identify, not just the 
existence of age- or disability-based state 
decisions, but a widespread pattern of 
irrational reliance on such criteria." ld. at 
735. This special element of race or other 
presumptively unconstitutional 
classifications has no bearing on review of 
whether Congress's remedy "fits" the 
proven pattern of discrimination. To hold 
otherwise would ignore completely the 
"vital principles necessary to maintain 
separation of powers and the federal 
balance" that the Court held paramount in 
Boerne. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507, 536 (1997) ..... 
The analysis above is my sole basis for 
finding § 4(b) of the VRA unconstitutional 
and thus for dissenting from the court's 
opinion. I need not and do not reach the 
constitutionality of § 5 itself. But before 
concluding, I want to address a critical 
aspect of § 5, and of some of the cases 
interpreting earlier versions of that section .. 
Section 5(b) makes unlawful any voting 
practice or procedure with respect to voting 
"that has the purpose of or will have the 
effect of diminishing the ability of any 
citizens of the United States on account of 
race or color . . . to elect their preferred 
candidates of choice." 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(b). 
And of course similar phrasing has been 
included in § 2 since 1982. See Voting 
Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub.L. 
No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)). 
The language (or a close equivalent) seems 
to have originated in one of the Court's 
earliest opinions on § 5, though only as an 
offhand phrase in its explanation of how a 
shift from district to at-large voting might 
dilute minority impact: "Voters who are 
members of a racial minority might well be 
in the majority in one district, but a decided 
minority in the county as a whole. This type 
of change could therefore nullify their 
ability to elect the candidate oftheir choice." 
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 
569 (1969). But the use of such language 
became troubling in Georgia v. Ashcroft, 
where the Court said that in the application 
of § 5 "a court should not focus solely on the 
comparative ability of a minority group to 
elect a candidate of its choice." 539 U.S. 
461, 480 (2003). The "solely" of course 
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indicates approval of such a consideration as 
one among several criteria for compliance 
with § 5. 
Implied from the statutory "their" is 
necessarily a "they." In the context of a 
statute speaking of impingements on 
citizens' voting "on account of race or 
color," and indeed in the universally 
accepted understanding of the provision, the 
"they" are necessarily members of minority 
groups. But in what sense do minority 
groups as such have a "preferred 
candidate"? Individuals, of course, have 
preferred candidates, but groups (unless 
literally monolithic) can do so only in the 
limited sense that a majority of the group 
may have a preferred candidate. Thus, when 
the provision is translated into operational 
English, it calls for assuring "the ability of a 
minority group's majority to elect their 
preferred candidates." 
This raises the question of what happened to 
the minority group's own minority-those 
who dissent from the preferences of the 
minority's majority? 
Of course in any polity that features 
majority rule, some people are bound to be 
outvoted on an issue or a candidate and thus 
to "lose"-on that round of the ongoing 
political game. Such losses are a necessary 
function of any system requiring less than 
unanimity (which would be hopelessly 
impractical). And in an open society that 
allows people freely to form associations, 
and to design those associations, some 
people obviously will be members of 
associations whose representatives from 
time to time express, in their name, opinions 
they do not share. But that again is a 
necessary function of having associations 
free to adopt a structure that empowers their 
leadership to speak with less than 
unanimous backing. 
But the implied "they" of § 5 is not a polity 
in itself; nor is it an association freely 
created by free citizens. Quite the reverse: It 
is a group constructed artificially by the 
mandate of Congress, entirely on the lines of 
race or ethnicity. 
On what authority has Congress constructed 
such groups? Purportedly the 15th 
Amendment to the Constitution. But that 
says that the "right of citizens of the United 
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged 
by the United States or by any State on 
account of race, color, or previous condition 
of servitude." 
It is hard to imagine language that could 
more clearly invoke universal individual 
rights. It is "citizens" who are protected, and 
they are protected from any denial of their 
rights that might be based on the specified 
group characteristics-race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude. The 
members of Congress who launched the 
amendment, said Senator Willard Warner, 
"profess to give to each individual an equal 
share of political power." Congo Globe, 40th 
Cong., 3d Sess. 861 (1869). 
The 15th Amendment was a pivot point in 
the struggle for universal human rights. The 
roots of the struggle are deep and obscure. 
Many trace the concept to the three great 
monotheistic religions, Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam. . . . Perhaps the 
Enlightenment, though in tension with 
organized religion, has a better title; it is 
clearly the immediate root of the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen. But at all events the 15th 
Amendment states a clear national 
commitment to universal, individual 
political rights regardless of race or color. 
Of course conventional political discourse 
often uses such terms as "the black vote," 
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"the youth vote," "the senior vote," etc. But 
those who use these terms . . . know 
perfectly well that they are 
oversimplifications, used to capture general 
political tendencies, not a justification for 
creating or assuming a political entity that 
functions through a demographic group's 
"majority." The Supreme COUli has 
recognized that these generalizations are no 
such justification. In Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 
630 (1993), it confronted racial 
gerrymandering that took the form of 
including in one district persons separated 
by geographic and political boundaries and 
who "may have little in common with one 
another but the color of their skin." ld. at 
647. Such a plan 
ld. 
bears an uncomfortable resemblance 
to political apatiheid. It reinforces 
the perception that members of the 
same racial group-regardless of 
their age, education, economic 
status, or the community in which 
they live-think alike, share the 
same political interests, and will 
prefer the same candidates at the 
polls. We have rejected such 
perceptions elsewhere as 
impermissible stereotypes. 
. . . Section 5's mandate to advance "the 
ability of any citizens of the United States 
on account of race or color ... to elect their 
preferred candidates of choice" is a partial 
retreat to pre-Revolutionary times, an era 
perhaps now so long past that its 
implications are forgotten. 
None of this is to suggest that the country 
need for a minute countenance deliberate 
voting rule manipulations aimed at reducing 
the voting impact of any racial group, 
whether in the form of restrictions on ballot 
access or of boundary-drawing. And in 
judicial proceedings to stamp out such 
manipulations, it would of course be no 
defense for the perpetrators to say that they 
sought only to downweight a minority's 
majority. But a congressional mandate to 
assure the electoral impact of any minority's 
majority seems to me more of a distortion 
than an enforcement of the 15th 
Amendment's ban on abridging the "right of 
citizens of the United States to vote ... on 
account of race, color, or previous condition 
of servitude." Preventing intentional 
discrimination against a minority is radically 
different from actively encouraging racial 
gerrymandering in favor of the minority 
(really, the majority of the minority), as § 5 
does. Assuming there are places in which a 
colorblind constitution does not suffice as a 
"universal constitutional principle," Parents 
v. Seattle School Dist. No.1, 551 U.S. 701, 
788 (2007) (Kennedy, 1.), the voting booth 
should not be one of them . 
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"Section 5 Challenges Reach Court" 
SCOTUSblog 
July 202012 
Lyle Denniston 
Attorneys for challengers to the 
constitutionality of the 1965 voting rights 
law's key provision for federal regulation of 
state and local election laws urged the 
Supreme Court on Friday to settle the issue 
in the next Term, starting October 1. One 
new case arrived from the town of 
Kinston in North Carolina and a second 
came from Shelby County in Alabama. The 
D.C. Circuit COUli has upheld the provision 
at issue-Section 5-although the Supreme 
Court itself three years ago raised significant 
questions about its validity. 
The Kinston case reached the Court this 
morning. The Shelby County case was filed 
in early afternoon. Not only has the time 
come to examine the constitutional 
questions the Court has raised, the Kinston 
petition argued, but the Justice Department's 
"overzealous manner" of enforcement of 
Section 5 has put heavy new burdens on 
state and local governments covered by that 
provlSlon. The Shelby County petition 
argued that the renewed law puts states into 
"federal receivership," raising "fundamental 
questions of state sovereignty," while 
denying equality only to designated states-
predominantly in the South. Shelby County 
also assailed the Justice Department's 
"needlessly aggressive exercise" of its veto 
powers over state and local election laws. 
Although the Kinston case was found to be 
moot by the D.C. Circuit, the petition 
challenged that conclusion and argued that 
the Justices should grant review of both that 
case and the one from Shelby County, 
contending that the North Carolina case 
pinpoints some of the key alterations in the 
law made by Congress in 2006. When 
Congress renewed Section 5 for an 
additional 25 years, it imposed added 
requirements on state and local governments 
covered by that section, toughening the 
standards for Washington approval of 
election law changes. The challengers in the 
Kinston litigation argued that those new 
burdens prove even more convincingly that 
Section 5 is now unconstitutionally broad as 
it applies to the state and local governments 
that remain the only ones targeted by 
Section 5. Shelby County's petition 
contended that the new requirements 
reinforce its argument that the entire 2006 
renewal law is invalid. 
Section 5 applies throughout nine states, and 
to various county or city governments in 
seven other states. The provision requires 
state and local governments that had a prior 
record of racial bias in voting to submit any 
change in their election laws, in advance of 
implementing such a change, either to the 
Justice Department or to a special three-
judge District Court in Washington. Only if 
a change was given "pre-clearance" in 
Washington could it be put into effect. 
When the Supreme COUli was last faced 
with a constitutional challenge to Section 5, 
three years ago, it bypassed the 
constitutional question by expanding the 
option of covered governments to "bail 
out." In doing so, however, the Court raised 
a variety of questions that suggested that the 
coverage formula may be seriously out of 
date, and thus may no longer be justified for 
just those covered governments. 
The negative comments by the Court then 
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encouraged challengers to go after Section 5 
anew. The Kinston and Shelby County 
cases were among a series of new 
challenges, along with lawsuits by states that 
seek to enforce new photo ID requirements 
for voters, but have been blocked by Justice 
Department objections. 
In its petition, Shelby County said that 
Section 5 interferes directly in "the basic 
operation of state and local government," 
which has the practical effect of barring "the 
implementation of more than 100,000 
electoral changes (more than 99 percent of 
which will be noncontroversial) unless and 
until they are pre-cleared by federal officials 
in Washington, D.C. . . . A covered 
jurisdiction must either go hat in hand to 
DOJ officialdom to seek approval, or 
embark on expensive litigation in a remote 
judicial venue if it wishes to make any 
change to its election system. It should be 
no surprise, then, that states such as Florida, 
Texas, and Alaska have joined Shelby 
County in challenging the 2006 
reauthorization." 
It summed up: "Only this Court, the ultimate 
guardian and arbiter of the division of 
powers that lies at the heart of our 
constitutional system, can settle these 
impOliant issues." Although the Court had 
previously upheld Section 5, the county 
petition argued, a new assessment is 
necessary to judge "whether Section 5's 
current needs justify its current burdens." 
The constitutional issues, it added, "will 
continue to fester until they are definitively 
settled." 
The Shelby County case is a challenge to the 
2006 extension both for its unchanged 
definition of the state and local governments 
that are targeted, as well as to the new 
requirements for pre-clearance that were 
imposed on those governments. The 
Kinston case is a challenge to the extension 
with a special emphasis on the new pre-
clearance standard. "This COUli should 
grant review of both cases," the North 
Carolina petition argued, in order "to 
facilitate a timely and definitive resolution 
of the exceptionally important question 
whether the 2006 version of Section 5 is 
facially valid." 
Here, in paraphrase, is the way the Kinston 
petition described the before and after 
versions of the two changes that Congress 
made in the pre-clearance standard: 
Before: A state or local government could 
be barred from making a change only if it 
had the purpose or the effect of taking away 
some of the voting power of minorities, 
taking into account all circumstances. 
Without that kind of proof, a government 
entity need not make a change to make 
minorities better off. After: The Justice 
Department can now object to a change that 
it believes discriminates against minorities 
by failing to make them better off. (This 
might be called the "Bossier 11 change" 
because Congress made it in 2006 in 
response to a Supreme Court decision in 
2000, in the case of Reno v. Bossier Parish, 
that Congress found had frustrated the goals 
of Section 5.) 
Before: Even if a change would take away 
some of the voting power of minorities, the 
change could be made anyway if the state or 
local government had offset that loss by 
doing something to improve minorities' 
voting power, or if it really had no choice 
but to make the change. After: A state or 
local government must provide proof that 
the change would not diminish the ability of 
minorities "to elect their preferred 
candidates of choice." This makes 
minorities' election success the decisive 
factor on whether they have lost 
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voting power. (That might be called the 
"Ashcroft change" because Congress in 
2006 was reacting to a 2003 Supreme Court 
decision, Georgia v. Ashcroft, which the 
lawmakers saw as narrowing the protection 
for minorities under Section 5.) 
In adopting those changes, the Kinston case 
lawyers argued, Congress essentially wiped 
out the Supreme Court rulings in Ashcroft 
and Bossier 11. The effect of those 
alterations of Section 5, that petition 
asserted, is to put a new and unconstitutional 
emphasis on using race, with the Justice 
Department conditioning its pre-clearance 
upon the use of race as a determining 
factor. Shelby County, too, argued in its 
petition that Congress' challenge to those 
two rulings by the expanded pre-clearance 
hurdle "compounded the problem" of 
relying on an out-of-date coverage formula. 
The Kinston case grew out of a 2008 voter-
approved change in the way Kinston chose 
its local government officials, from one 
based on party identification of candidates to 
a non-paliisan approach. Because Kinston 
is located in a county covered by Section 5, 
it needed Washington clearance to 
implement the change. The Justice 
Department objected, contending that 
switching to non-partisan voting would 
diminish blacks' voting strength because it 
would not allow their preferred candidates 
who had run as Democrats to count on the 
voters of whites who also were Democrats. 
Section 5 was then challenged in federal 
court by John Nix, who had wanted to run as 
a non-patiy candidate for city council, and 
by a local organization that favored non-
partisan elections. The lawsuit challenged 
the old and unchanged coverage formula, 
and the new changes in the pre-clearance 
standard. A federal District judge rejected 
both challenges. But, during briefing in the 
D.C. Circuit Court, the Justice Depatiment 
changed position, and said it was 
withdrawing its objection to the switch to 
non-partisan voting. That led the Circuit 
Court to conclude that the Kinston case was 
now moot. 
In the petition to the Supreme Court, the 
Kinston challengers argued that the 
Department's claim of "new evidence" was 
only "a transparent pretext for DOJ to try to 
moot this case to avoid defending on appeal 
the 2006 amendments"-amendments that 
had not been challenged in the separate 
Shelby County case. No other challenger 
has specifically protested in court against 
those changes, the petition said. "This Court 
cannot properly discharge [its] vital 
responsibility without fully considering the 
nature and degree of the burden that the 
substantive pre-clearance standard imposes." 
With the issue of mootness in that case, the 
petition went on, the Supreme Court should 
still vote to grant multiple cases-the two 
new ones-in order to address the full range 
of issues now affecting Section 5. In any 
event, they contended, the D.C. Circuit was 
clearly wrong in allowing the Justice 
Depatiment to come in at the last minute to 
try to scuttle the broader challenge to the 
2006 extension of Section 5. 
In its challenge to Section 5 on the merits, 
the Kinston petition argued that the Supreme 
Court had sent a clear signal to Congress 
that it ought to consider modifying the 
coverage formula for Section 5, based as it 
is on out-of-date considerations. But, it 
noted, Congress has done nothing to respond 
to the Court's constitutional concerns. "In 
the three years since," the petition said, 
"Congress has refused to take any action, 
declining to update (or even revisit) the pre-
clearance regime to ensure that its 'disparate 
geographic coverage is sufficiently related 
to the problem that it targets,'" quoting from 
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the Court's 2009 opinion In the case of 
Northwest Austin v. Holder. 
Shelby County's petition echoed that 
complaint. "In the more than three years 
after Northwest Austin, Congress held not 
one hearing, proposed not one bill, and 
amended not one law in response to the 
concern" that Section 5 and other coverage 
formulas in the 1965 law are not justified by 
the evidence before Congress in 2006. 
While praising Congress for enacting the 
original bill in 1965, when it crafted "a 
coverage formula that was sound in theory 
and in practice" at that time, the same 
cannot be said of the 2006 extension, 
according to the county's filing. 
Besides challenging Section 5 itself, the 
Shelby County petition also contests the 
constitutionality of the 1965 law's Section 
4(b), which is the provision that lays out the 
formula that brought a state or a local 
government under Section 5's pre-clearance 
requirement. 
Shelby County, while it is covered by the 
law, did not file its lawsuit after having a 
voting change vetoed by the Justice 
Department or by a federal court. Instead, it 
filed a lawsuit seeking to strike down the 
2006 renewal as written, so that, if this 
challenge succeeded, the law could not be 
validly applied in any factual situation. 
The Kinston case, Nix v. Holder, has now 
been docketed as 12-81. The Shelby County 
case has now been docketed as 12-96. 
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"Insight: From Alabama, an Epic Challenge to Voting Rights" 
Re1lters 
June 4, 2012 
Joan Biskupic 
Four years ago, in this small city of gentle 
hills, tall oaks and nine stoplights, an 
invisible line was drawn a few miles north 
of the center of town. It stretched up beyond 
Highway 22 and looped west across 
Interstate 65, sweeping in recent housing 
developments, the brown-brick Concord 
Baptist Church and a new Wal-Mart. The 
narrow five-square-mile rectangle enlarged 
Voting District 2. 
It also radically changed the district's racial 
mix. The expansion brought in hundreds of 
white voters, cutting the proportion of black 
registered voters to one-third from more 
than two-thirds. The city, which said it had 
to redraw its district map to account for a 
population increase and land annexations, 
contended the new boundaries would not 
discriminate against blacks. 
The U.S. Department of Justice was not 
persuaded. In a tersely worded, three-page 
letter emailed to the Calera city attorney on 
August 25, 2008, it voided the new map. 
The letter set off a chain of events resulting 
in what could be the most important 
challenge in years to the 1965 Voting Rights 
Act. A lawsuit later brought by Shelby 
County, where Calera is situated, seeks to 
strike down the law's requirement that 
Alabama and other states with a history of 
discrimination obtain federal approval for 
any changes to districting and ballot rules. 
They argue that this federal "preclearance" 
obligation, mandated by Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act, is an outdated, unfair and 
unconstitutional relic of an Old South that 
no longer exists. 
Now Shelby County v. Hohler is poised to 
reach the U.S. Supreme Court. Last month a 
federal appeals court in Washington rejected 
the claim and upheld the Section 5 
preclearance requirement, saying Congress 
had enough evidence of recent racial 
discrimination to justify reauthorizing the 
law when it did so in 2006. Racial 
discrimination in voting is "one of the 
gravest evils that Congress can seek to 
redress," U.S. Appeals Court Judge David 
Tatel declared for the court majority. 
But Chief Justice John Roberts of the U.S. 
Supreme Court appears ready to re-examine 
the preclearance rule, which covers all or 
part of 16 states, most of them in the South. 
In deciding another case three years ago, he 
wrote: "Things have changed in the South." 
He suggested that the provision may no 
longer be needed. 
As events in Calera show, however, whether 
the law is unnecessary is far from obvious. 
DARK CHAPTERS 
Like many places in the Old South, Calera 
and surrounding Shelby County witnessed 
dark chapters of racial violence after the 
Civil War. Lynching continued into the 
early 1900s. In Calera, older residents still 
recall poll taxes and Dairy Queen drinking 
fountains marked "whites" and "colored." 
As recently as 1999 a large Confederate flag 
hung in the entrance to the Shelby County 
Historical Society Museum, according to 
Bobby Joe Seales, society president, who 
said he removed the flag that year when he 
took office. 
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But Calera has changed. Thanks partly to 
spillover from bedroom communities in 
Birmingham to the north, its population has 
more than doubled in the last decade to 
11,700. A city once known for its rail hub 
and lime manufacturing now boasts a 
growing service and retailing sector. Blacks 
continue to make up slightly more than a 
fifth of the population, but neighborhoods 
are much less clearly defined by race. 
Recently, as he drove a visitor around new 
subdivisions off Highway 31, Calera's 41-
year-old mayor, Jon Graham, pointed out 
houses owned by blacks alongside others 
owned by whites. "We see no difference in 
skin color in Calera," he said. 
The mayor, who has close-cropped brown 
hair and an open boyish face, said the city 
was not trying to reduce black voter strength 
when it redrew District 2 in 2008. To the 
contrary, he said, thanks to increased 
integration, it would have been hard to draw 
a majority-black district without creating 
wildly gerrymandered lines. 
"Integration has been effective," said 
Graham, who in addition to his civic duties 
operates an auto-parts shop. "It's hard to 
take this city and dissect it and come up with 
one true, heavily populated minority 
district. " 
A VOIDED ELECTION 
In rejecting Calera's new districts, the 
Justice DepaIiment claimed that the city had 
not adequately tracked black popUlation nor 
properly apprised the depaIiment of some 
177 land annexations. Its letter to the city 
stated that basic information from the city 
about its voting-age population and racial 
makeup was "unreliable." 
Lawyers for the city disagreed and thought 
they could persuade federal authorities to 
accept the new map. Plus, they had a city 
council election scheduled for the next day, 
which they believed could not be postponed 
under state law. So on August 26, 2008, 
Calera went to the polls. 
The outcome only proved the problem. 
Ernest Montgomery, the District 2 
representative and the only African 
American on the five-member city council, 
was voted out. 
The Justice DepaIiment swiftly blocked 
certification of the election results, and 
Montgomery kept his seat pending a new 
vote. 
In an interview at the New Mount Moriah 
Missionary Baptist Church that he has 
attended since childhood, Montgomery, a 
55-year-old machinist with a reserved 
manner, said he believed some whites voted 
for his opponent simply based on the color 
of his skin. He did not feel the redrawn 
district had been "intentionally stacked." 
But, he added, "I know others in the 
community thought so." 
His pastor, Harry Jones, 48, is one of them. 
"The only African American that we had in 
there got the short end of the stick," he said. 
After a year of negotiation, Calera decided 
to get rid of its five-district map entirely and 
created six "at large" council seats that 
would be filled by members elected by the 
city as a whole. In a new election in 2009, 
Montgomery won one of them. 
TROLLING FOR A TEST CASE 
Things might have ended there. But in 2008 
a Washington, D.C.-based conservative 
advocate named Edward Blum was trolling 
the Justice Department website for potential 
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voting-rights test cases. The Calera letter, 
which was posted on the site, caught his eye. 
Blum picked up the phone and called Frank 
"Butch" Ellis, the lawyer for Calera and for 
Shelby County. Ellis, who had been working 
as a municipal lawyer in central Alabama 
for 40 years, was as frustrated as Blum was 
with the federal preclearance requirement. 
Blum told Ellis he already was busy with a 
Section 5 challenge involving an Austin, 
Texas, water district that was working its 
way up through the courts but said he was 
always on the lookout for other 
opportunities. The men agreed to stay in 
touch. "We felt that the Justice Department 
was stuck in a 1960s time warp," Blum said. 
A former investment banker, Blum had been 
challenging race-based policies since 1992, 
when he lost an election for Congress in a 
racially drawn Houston district. His case 
against Texas officials over the line-drawing 
went all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
and in 1996 the court ruled the district 
unconstitutional. Since then Blum, thin, 
angular, with a formal presence, has sought 
out government programs that he believes 
wrongly use racial criteria. Now 60 and a 
visiting fellow at the American Enterprise 
Institute, Blum raises money through his 
foundation, the Project on Fair 
Representation, to hire lawyers to challenge 
racial redistricting, affirmative action and 
other such policies. 
In the Austin water district case, Blum 
thought he had found the perfect plaintiff for 
an attack on Section 5. But when the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided the case in 2009, it 
punted on the big constitutional issue-
whether Congress had enough evidence of 
discrimination to justify reauthorizing the 
law. It said the water district was exempt 
from Section 5 based on its clean voting-
rights record. 
Blum was in the courtroom when the 
decision was announced, and his hemi sank. 
"I was waiting for a few key words, and I 
didn't get them," he said. Yet Roberts's 
opinion for the court offered him some hope 
when it suggested the South had changed. 
BACK TO SHELBY COUNTY 
In frustration, Blum reached out again to 
Butch Ellis in Shelby County. The two men 
commiserated over their disappointment. 
Blum said he thought Shelby County could 
bring a stronger case against Section 5 than 
the Austin water district. After all, Calera's 
conflict with the Justice Depmiment meant 
the county did not have a clean voting-rights 
record so its argument could not get tossed 
out on the same technicality. 
Ellis, a 72-year-old county lawyer who grew 
up on a nearby dairy farm, said he supports 
the overall principles of the Voting Rights 
Act and its provision allowing people to sue 
for intentional discrimination. But the 
Section 5 preclearance obligation, he said, 
unnecessarily covers the smallest electoral 
change, even moving a polling place across 
the street. 
"It had its time. Its time has come. And it's 
gone," he said. Ellis said racial tensions had 
faded in Shelby County, one of the more 
prosperous and highly educated in Alabama. 
He boasted that any visitor to the county 
would observe black and white children 
playing together. 
Realizing that a big constitutional challenge 
would need major legal firepower, Blum 
connected Ellis to the prominent 
Washington, D.C., lawyer Bert Rein, whose 
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firm, Wiley Rein, has handled cases for 
Blum since the mid-1990s. Rein is 
representing the plaintiff in another high-
profile lawsuit that Blum coordinated, a 
challenge to affirmative action at the 
University of Texas, to be heard by the 
Supreme Court this autumn. 
SHELBY COUNTY TAKES AIM 
In April 2010, Shelby County filed a lawsuit 
against the Justice Department at the U.S. 
District Court in Washington, taking direct 
aim at Section 5. The suit argued that 
Congress when reauthorizing the law in 
2006 did not have enough evidence to 
justify its continuation or the places covered. 
When NAACP Legal Defense Fund lawyer 
Ryan Haygood in New York saw the lawsuit 
he immediately realized its importance. But 
he also thought Blum had picked a 
problematic plaintiff. The Calera, Shelby 
County, election in which the only black 
candidate lost, he said, proved how the law 
protects racial minorities. "They absolutely 
chose the wrong venue for the proposition 
that Section 5 has outlived its usefulness," 
Haygood said, adding flatly, "See Ernest 
Montgomery. " 
Haygood flew out to Calera and met with 
council member Montgomery, pastor Jones, 
and other African Americans at the New 
Mount Moriah church. They agreed to 
intervene in the case on the side of the 
Justice Department, arguing that Section 5 is 
still vital to minority voting rights. The 
NAACP defense fund would represent them. 
Last year the district court ruled against 
Shelby County. Judge John Bates, a George 
W. Bush appointee, said Congress had 
extensive evidence of recent voting abuses 
in Alabama, such as "reports of voting 
officials closing doors on African-American 
voters." He noted that Calera's redistricting 
plan would have eliminated the sole 
majority-black district. Last month, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld 
the district court ruling. 
Rein, representing Shelby County, said he 
planned to file an appeal this summer. 
Montgomery, who attended segregated 
schools until junior high, said his elderly 
parents were nervous about his becoming 
part of the national case. They remembered 
how, in their day, blacks who took a stand 
were threatened, harassed or worse. "I know 
we've gone a long way," said Montgomery, 
"but we have a long way to go." 
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"Appeals Court Upholds Key 
Voting-Rights Law" 
Wall Street J01lrnal 
May 18,2012 
Evan Perez 
An appeals court upheld a federal voting-
rights law that requires some local 
governments to seek Washington's approval 
before changing election procedures, 
rejecting a challenge by an Alabama county. 
In a 2-1 decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled 
Friday that Section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 remains constitutional. The 
judges said Congress acted properly in 2006 
to reauthorize the law in order to protect 
minority voters. 
Section 5 requires parts or all of 16 states 
with a history of racial bias in elections to 
seek federal approval, or preclearance, 
before altering voting procedures. 
The decision came in a challenge by Shelby 
County, Ala., and was viewed as an 
important test of Section 5, which a 2009 
Supreme Court ruling suggested may no 
longer be justified given changes in voting 
patterns. The appellate court cited that 
decision, which upheld the Voting Rights 
Act but also opened the door to challenges 
to Section 5. 
The appellate panel said it weighed concerns 
about whether Section 5 remains "congruent 
and proportional" to the problem it seeks to 
prevent. It determined that "Congress drew 
reasonable conclusions from the extensive 
evidence it gathered" and acted III 
accordance with the Constitution in 
"ensuring that the right to vote ... -surely 
among the most important guarantees of 
political liberty in the Constitution-is not 
abridged on account of race." Congress 
deserved deference in making the judgment, 
the court said. 
The county indicated it plans to appeal to the 
Supreme Court. 
Shelby County, which includes suburbs of 
Birmingham, argued Section 5 places an 
undue burden on local governments. The 
provision could only be justified if there 
were current evidence the jurisdiction was 
carrying out the "unremitting and ingenious 
defiance" that existed in 1965 when the 
original law was passed, the county said. 
The majority opinion by Judge David Tatel, 
a Clinton appointee, was joined by Judge 
Thomas Griffith, a George W. Bush 
appointee. 
Dissenting Judge Stephen Williams, a 
Reagan appointee, suggested Section 5 
could be used to encourage "racial 
gerrymandering in favor of the minority." 
He said "a congressional mandate to assure 
the electoral impact of any minority'S 
majority seems to me more of a distortion 
than an enforcement of the 15th 
Amendment's ban on abridging" the right to 
vote because of race. 
County attorney Frank "Butch" Ellis said 
Shelby County suppOlied the Voting Rights 
Act and wanted only to be released from the 
burden of preclearance in recognition of 
how much the county has changed in nearly 
50 years. 
"I'm pleased with the strong dissent," Mr. 
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Ellis said in an interview, adding that the 
county believes now is the time to seek a 
Supreme COUlt decision on Section 5's 
constitutionality. 
A U.S. Justice Depmtment statement said it 
welcomed the ruling and that Section 5 
"continues to serve as a critical tool in both 
blocking and deterring discriminatory voting 
practices. " 
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"Do We Still Need the Voting Rights Act?" 
The New Yorker 
May 22,2012 
Jeffrey Toobin 
The chances to remake American law-and 
maybe American society-are stacking up 
for the Supreme Court. Next month, the 
Justices will render their verdicts on the 
Affordable Care Act and on the Arizona 
immigration law. The fate of affirmative 
action in university admissions will likely be 
determined by the Roberts Court in its next 
term, and now another blockbuster appears 
headed for the Justices as well. The future of 
the Voting Rights Act-probably the Great 
Society's greatest landmark-will almost 
certainly be in the Court's hands next year. 
The hemi of the Voting Rights Act is its 
famous Section 5, which essentially put the 
South on perpetual probation. In rough 
terms, the law requires the states of the old 
Confederacy (as well as a few smaller areas 
outside the South) to submit any changes in 
their electoral law to the Justice Depmiment 
for what's known as "pre-clearance"-to 
make sure that the changes don't infringe on 
minority voting rights. Before Section 5, 
states and municipalities could simply 
change their rules-about everything from 
the location of polling places to the borders 
of district lines-and dare civil-rights 
activists to sue to stop them. It was a 
maddening, and very high-stakes, game of 
whack-a-mole. As a result of Section 5, 
though, the Justice Department monitored 
these moves and made sure there would be 
no backsliding on voting rights. 
In 1965, Congress authorized Section 5 for 
five years. In subsequent years, Congress 
has extended the provision several times, 
and in 2006, it was reauthorized for another 
twenty-five years. In 2009, the Supreme 
Court ducked a challenge to the law on 
procedural grounds, but now the issue 
cannot be evaded any longer. Last week, a 
three-judge panel of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit voted two-
to-one to uphold the Voting Rights Act and 
reject a challenge to Section 5 by Shelby 
County, in Alabama. Next stop for the case: 
the Supreme Court. 
The questions at the heart of the case are 
both simple and profound. How much has 
American society, and especially the South, 
changed with regard to race relations since 
1965? Is Section 5 still a necessary check on 
the white majority-or is the law a 
patronizing relic of a vanished age? Judge 
David Tatel, writing for the majority, said 
Congress still had the right to insist that the 
Justice Department continue to monitor 
voting rights in the South. 
Tatel's opinion acknowledged the obvious: 
that a great deal had changed for the better 
in the South, and elsewhere, since 1965. He 
said futiher that the evidence of continuing 
discrimination was "by no means 
unambiguous." Still, while the days of Bull 
Connor are long gone, Tatel said that 
Congress still had reason to keep Section 5 
in place when it held the reauthorization 
vote in 2006. "Vote dilution" remained a big 
problem for black citizens; that is, white 
legislators were still "'packing' minorities 
into a single district, spreading minority 
voters thinly among several districts, 
annexing predominately white suburbs, and 
so on." Celiain facts, too, were unavoidable, 
notably that "not one African American had 
yet been elected to statewide office in 
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Mississippi, Louisiana, or South Carolina." 
In short, Tatel concluded that "serious and 
widespread intentional discrimination 
persisted in covered jurisdictions and that 
case-by-case enforcement alone ... would 
leave minority citizens with an inadequate 
remedy." Without Section 5, Tatel 
concluded, the rights of minority voters 
would be in jeopardy. 
The dissent of Judge Stephen Williams came 
down to a simple idea: times have changed. 
Even the Justice Department, he pointed out, 
scarcely ever objects to the changes 
submitted for preclearance. (There were 
only five objections for every ten thousand 
submissions between 1998 and 2002.) 
Williams acknowledges that racial bias still 
exists, but he noted, with some justification, 
that it's now as evident in uncovered 
jurisdictions (i.e., the rest of the country) as 
in the South. But that melancholy 
observation led Williams to conclude that 
the Voting Rights Act should not apply 
anywhere anymore. 
It's a hard case. "Things have changed in the 
South," Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., 
wrote in the 2009 opinion that put off the 
Voting Rights Act's day of reckoning. 
"Voter turnout and registration rates now 
approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory 
evaSIOns of federal decrees are rare. And 
minority candidates hold office at 
unprecedented levels." All true, to be sure. 
One might also add that the President of the 
United States, who won office with the 
Electoral College votes of Virginia and 
North Carolina, is African-American. In this 
way, the United States of 2012 is an almost 
unrecognizable version of the country in 
1965. 
But as those changes illustrate, nothing 
about the nation is static, and it's not easy to 
say which way the country is moving on 
racial matters. By overwhelming majorities, 
both Houses of Congress thought it was 
worthwhile to maintain the federal 
monitoring that has made such changes took 
place. It's a more complicated country these 
days, but it's not a fully healed one, either. 
So far, the Roberts Court has been eager to 
portray the nation as beyond the need for 
racial remedies-especially with regard to 
public schools. In light of that record, the 
odds are that the Court will reach the same 
kind of conclusion with regard to the Voting 
Rights Act and declare Section 5 
unconstitutional. At that point, the white-
controlled legislatures of the former 
Confederacy will be largely on their own in 
protecting minority voting rights. For better 
or worse, our problems are solved when the 
Court says they are-and these Justices 
appear determined indeed to close the door 
to an era that may not be completely over. 
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United States v. Danieiczyk 
No. 11-4667 
Ruling Below: United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012). 
William Danielczyk and Eugene Biagi were indicted under the Federal Election Campaign Act 
of 1971 (FECA), which bans direct corporate contributions to political campaigns. The district 
court granted Danielczyk and Biagi's motion to dismiss count four, paragraph lOeb) of their 
indictment that asserted they conspired and facilitated direct contributions to Hillary Clinton's 
2008 presidential campaign. The district court held that in light of Citizens United v. FEC, FECA 
section 441 b(a) was unconstitutional as applied to the defendants and dismissed count four, 
paragraph 1 O(b). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district 
court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that Citizens United does not render FECA's ban on 
direct corporate contributions unconstitutional as applied to the defendants. 
Question Presented: Whether the holding in Citizens United v. FEC also held unconstitutional 
the prohibition of direct corporate contributions to political campaigns under the Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
WILLIAM P. DANIELCZYK, JR., a/k/a Bill Danielczyk; Eugene R. Biagi, a/k/a Gene 
Biagi, Defendants-Appellees 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
Decided June 28, 2012 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations 
omitted.] 
GREGORY, Circuit Judge: 
The Government appeals the district court's 
grant of William P. Danielczyk, Jr. and 
Eugene R. Biagi's (the "Appellees") motion 
to dismiss count four and paragraph 1 O(b) of 
the indictment, alleging that they conspired 
to and did facilitate direct contributions to 
Hillary Clinton's 2008 presidential 
campaign in violation of 2 U.S.C. § 441 b(a) 
of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971 ("FECA"), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The 
district cOUli reasoned that in light of 
Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, - U.S. --, 130 S.Ct. 876 
(2010), § 441 b( a) is unconstitutional as 
applied to the Appellees. We disagree for 
the following reasons and thus reverse the 
district court's grant of the motion to 
dismiss count four and paragraph 1 O(b) of 
the indictment. 
I. 
Danielczyk and Biagi were officers of Galen 
Capital Group, LLC, and Galen Capital 
Corporation (together, "Galen"). At the time 
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of the charged conduct, Danielczyk was 
Galen's chairman, while Biagi was Galen's 
secretary. In March of 2007, Danielczyk co-
hosted a fundraiser for Clinton's campaign 
and had individuals, including Biagi, give 
donations to the campaign with the promise 
that they would be reimbursed by Galen. 
Danielczyk and Biagi concealed Galen's 
reimbursements by writing "consulting fees" 
on the reimbursement checks' memorandum 
lines, by issuing the checks for amounts 
larger than the actual contributions, and by 
creating false back-dated letters to the 
individual donors that characterized the 
reimbursement payments as "consulting 
fees." In total, Danielczyk and Biagi 
reimbursed the donors for $156,400 in 
contributions made to Clinton's 2008 
campaign, and the campaign in turn reported 
the contributions to the Federal Election 
Commission. 
Danielczyk and Biagi were indicted on 
seven counts for this contribution scheme. 
Count four and paragraph 1 O(b) respectively 
charged the Appellees with knowingly and 
willfully causing contributions of corporate 
money to a candidate for federal office, 
aggregating $25,000 or more, in violation of 
§ 44Ib(a) and 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d)(I)(A)(i), 
and conspiring to do so. On April 6, 2011, 
Danielczyk and Biagi moved to dismiss 
count four, contending that § 441 b( a) is 
unconstitutional as applied to them in light 
of Citizens United. 
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Citizens United, § 441 b(a) made it unlawful 
for corporations to make both direct 
contributions to political candidates and 
independent expenditures on speech that 
expressly advocates for or against the 
election or defeat of a candidate. However, 
the FECA permitted individuals to make 
independent expenditures and direct 
contributions within limits. See, e.g., 2 
U.S.c. § 441a(a). The act also allowed 
corporations wanting to make either type of 
expenditure to form political action 
committees ("P ACs"), which were entities 
separate from the corporations subject to 
regulatory requirements. See 2 U.S.c. § 
441 b(b )(2)(C); 11 C.F.R. §§ 114.1 (a)(2)(iii), 
(b), and lI4.5(d). Citizens United struck 
down § 441 b(a)'s prohibition against 
corporate independent expenditures, 
reasoning in part that the ban was not 
supported by the interest in preventing quid 
pro quo corruption, 130 S.Ct. at 908-09, and 
further that "the First Amendment does not 
allow political speech restrictions based on a 
speaker's corporate identity," id. at 903. 
Citizens United left untouched § 441b(a)'s 
ban on direct corporate contributions. 
Relying on Citizens United, the district court 
held that § 441 b(a),s ban on direct corporate 
contributions as applied to Galen is 
unconstitutional because it impermissibly 
treats corporations and individuals unequally 
for purposes of political speech. The district 
court rejected the Government's contention 
that the differential treatment of 
corporations in the context of direct 
contributions fulfills legitimate 
governmental interests, such as the 
prevention of quid pro quo conuption. It 
concluded that the interest in preventing 
quid pro quo corruption could be fulfilled by 
requiring corporations to comply with the 
act's contribution limits for individual 
donors. 
Five days after it granted the motion to 
dismiss, the district court sua sponte ordered 
the parties to file briefs on whether, in light 
of Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), 
and Federal Election Commission v. 
Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003), the court 
should reconsider its decision. In Beaumont, 
the Supreme Court rejected an as-applied 
challenge to § 441 b( a)' s ban on direct 
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corporate contributions. 539 U.S. at 163. 
The Government argued that Beaumont 
directly controlled the case and must be 
applied even if Citizens United may have 
eroded Beaumont's reasoning. This is 
because the Agostini principle requires 
lower cOUlis to apply Supreme Court 
precedent that directly controls the case 
before it despite subsequent Supreme Court 
case law that may have affected the 
precedent by implication. 521 U.S. at 237. 
After considering the briefs, the district 
court denied reconsideration of its dismissal. 
It reasoned that Beaumont did not directly 
control the case because it addressed an as-
applied challenge of § 441b(a)'s ban on 
direct corporate contributions against a 
nonprofit corporation and not, as in this 
case, a for-profit corporation like Galen. The 
district court further affirmed the rationale in 
its earlier ruling that § 441 b( a) violated 
Citizens United by treating corporations and 
individuals unequally. Accordingly, it 
concluded that count four and paragraph 
1 O(b) remained dismissed. The Government 
timely appealed. 
II. 
For the following reasons, we hold that § 
441 b(a) is not unconstitutional as applied to 
the Appellees. Bea1lmont clearly supports 
the constitutionality of § 441 b(a) and 
Citizens United, a case that addresses 
corporate independent expenditures, does 
not undermine Beaumont's reasoning on this 
point. The district court erred when it 
granted the Appellees' motion to dismiss. 
A. 
The Agostini principle provides that in 
circumstances when Supreme Court 
precedent has "direct application in a case, 
yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in 
some other line of decisions, [courts] should 
follow the line of cases which directly 
controls, leaving to [the Supreme] Court the 
prerogative of overturning its own 
decisions." Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 
237 (1997)). Thus, lower courts should not 
conclude that the Supreme Court's "more 
recent cases have, by implication, overruled 
[its] earlier precedent." Id. 
In Beaumont, the Supreme Court addressed 
a First Amendment challenge to § 441b(a) 
as it applied to nonprofit advocacy 
corporations. Federal Election Commission 
v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 156 (2003). In 
that case, North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. 
("NCRL"), a nonprofit corporation 
organized to provide counseling to pregnant 
women and to promote alternatives to 
abortion, brought an as-applied challenge to 
§ 441 b( a)' s ban on direct corporate 
contributions and independent expenditures. 
Id. at 150. A panel of this Circuit found the 
ban on both independent expenditures and 
direct contributions unconstitutional as 
applied to NCRL. Beaumont v. FEC, 278 
F.3d 261, 279 (4th Cir.2002), rev'd by 
Bea1lmont, 539 U.S. 146. 
With respect to direct contributions, the 
panel reasoned that the ban was unjustified 
in light of Federal Election Commission v. 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. 
("MCFL"), 479 U.S. 238, 259 (1986), a 
decision in which the Supreme COUli held 
that § 441 b( a)' s ban on independent 
expenditures was unconstitutional as applied 
to a nonprofit corporation that, in many 
respects, was similar to NCRL. Id. at 275. 
As a result, the panel extended MCFL's 
holding that solely addressed § 441b(a)'s 
ban on independent expenditures to the 
context of the provision's ban on direct 
contributions, concluding that "[i]n neither 
case is there the threat of quid pro quo, 
monetary influence, or distOliion corruption 
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that the prohibitions seek to prevent." ld. 
After this Circuit denied a rehearing en 
banc, the Federal Election Commission 
petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari 
only on the issue of whether the ban on 
direct contributions was constitutional. 
Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 151. 
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court 
reversed this Circuit's opinion. 539 U.S. at 
163. In doing so, the Supreme Court 
thoroughly explained its longstanding 
jurisprudence upholding Congress's 
"original, core prohibition on direct 
corporate contributions" and warned that 
this jurisprudence "would discourage any 
broadside attack on corporate campaign 
finance regulation of corporate 
contributions." ld. at 153, 156. It remarked 
that it had previously held that § 441 b(a) had 
"broad applicability" to both corporations 
and labor unions regardless of their financial 
disposition and rejected NCRL's various 
arguments to limit this applicability, 
including that the ban did not adequately 
consider the variations between corporations 
with respect to affluence and diversity of 
corporate form.ld. at 157. It then recognized 
four government interests that supported the 
ban on direct corporate contributions: anti-
corruption, anti-distortion, dissenting-
shareholder, and anti-circumvention 
(preventing the evasion of valid individual 
contribution limits). ld. at 153-55. The 
Supreme Court rejected NCRL's position 
that these government interests are 
implicated only by for-profit corporations, 
reasoning that non-profits, just like for-
profits, benefit from state-created 
advantages, can amass political war chests, 
and are susceptible to corruption and misuse 
as conduits for circumventing individual 
contribution limits. ld. at 160. Thus, in 
addressing § 441 b(a),s applicability to a 
nonprofit advocacy corporation, the Court 
based its conclusion on a century of law that 
has supported bans on direct contributions 
against for-profit corporations. ld. at 157. 
Overall, Bea1lmont makes clear that § 
441 b( a)' s ban on direct corporate 
contributions is constitutional as applied to 
all corporations. 
B. 
The Appellees contend that Bea1lmont does 
not govern our inquiry here because its 
holding was limited to nonprofit 
corporations. For the reasons expressed 
above, we do not read Bea1lmont so 
narrowly. Bea1lmont stands for the 
proposition that a nonprofit corporation does 
not differ from a for-profit corporation for 
purposes of § 441 b(a) because all 
corporations implicate the asserted 
government interests, and § 441 b( a) is 
closely drawn to further those interests. 
However, even if we did agree with the 
Appellees, we cannot ignore Bea1lmont's 
extensive discussion of Congress's 
legitimate interests in regulating direct 
contributions made by all corporations. As 
the Supreme COUli has stated, "When an 
opinion issues for the Court, it is not only 
the result but also those portions of the 
opinion necessary to that result by which we 
are bound." Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 
U.S. 44, 67 (1996). Nor should we forget 
that NCRL recognized the uphill battle it 
faced in challenging the general ban on 
direct contributions and thus did not request 
complete upheaval of the law, but only that 
non-profits, like it, be exempt. Bea1lmont, 
539 U.S. at 156. Thus, at the very least, 
Bea1lmont's discussion of the ban as it 
applies to all corporations informs our 
inquiry here. 
c. 
The Appellees would have this Court hold 
that Citizens United repudiated Bea1lmont's 
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entire reasoning; this we cannot do. Citizens 
United held that in the context of 
independent expenditures, the Government 
could not suppress political speech on the 
basis of the speaker's corporate identity. In 
reaching its decision, the Court did not 
discuss Bea1lmont and explicitly declined to 
address the constitutionality of the ban on 
direct contributions. Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission, - U.S. -, 
130 S.Ct. 876, 909 (2010). Nor did the 
opinion indicate that its "corporations-are-
equal-to-people" logic necessarily applies in 
the context of direct contributions. ld. at 
903. Leaping to this conclusion ignores the 
well-established principle that independent 
expenditures and direct contributions are 
subject to different standards of scrutiny and 
supported by different government interests. 
See Preston v. Leake, 660 F.3d 726, 735 (4th 
Cir.20 11 ) (concluding that Citizens United 
did not overrule "B1Ickley [v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 
(1976)], Nixon v. [Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 
528 U.S. 377, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 
886 (2000)], Bea1lmont, or other cases 
applying 'closely drawn' scrutiny to 
contribution restrictions"). 
Independent expenditure limitations are 
"substantial rather than merely theoretical 
restraints on the quantity and diversity of 
political speech." B1Ickley, 424 U.S. at 19. 
"By contrast . . . a limitation upon the 
amount that anyone person or group may 
contribute to a candidate or political 
committee entails only a marginal restriction 
upon the contributor's ability to engage in 
free communication," id. at 20-21, and thus 
"lie[ s] closer to the edges than to the core of 
political expression," Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 
161. The "markedly greater burden" on 
basic freedoms imposed by independent 
expenditure limitations requires that these 
limitations survive "exact scrutiny 
applicable to limitations on core First 
Amendment rights of political expression." 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44. 
Direct contribution limitations, on the other 
hand, require the "lesser demand of being 
closely drawn to match a sufficiently 
important interest." Bea1lmont, 539 U.S. at 
162 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 
reason for this difference in scrutiny is clear: 
independent expenditures, by definition, are 
direct means by which political speech 
enters into the marketplace, see Citizens 
United, 130 S.Ct. at 898; direct 
contributions, conversely, do not necessarily 
fund political speech but must be 
transformed into speech by an individual 
other than the contributor, see Bea1lmont, 
539 U.S at 161-62. To minimize the 
constitutional differences between 
regulations that govern independent 
expenditures and regulations that ban direct 
contributions by applying Citizens United to 
this case would repeat the same error this 
Circuit committed in Beaumont. See 
Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 151 (rejecting this 
Circuit's conclusion that "the rationale 
utilized by the Court in [MCFL ] to declare 
prohibitions on independent expenditures 
unconstitutional as applied to MCFL-type 
corporations is equally applicable in the 
context of direct contributions."). 
As recently recognized by the Second and 
Ninth Circuits, Citizens United preserved 
two of the four important government 
interests recognized in Beaumont: anti-
corruption and anti-circumvention. 
Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 195 n. 21 
(2d Cir.20 11 ) (declining to hold that 
Beallmont was ovenuled by Citizens United, 
and determining that Citizens United 
preserved the anti-corruption and anti-
circumvention interests); Thalheimer v. City 
of San Diego, 645 F .3d 1109, 1125 (9th 
Cir.20 11) (holding that Citizens United did 
not disapprove of the anti-circumvention 
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interest); Green Party of Conn. v. Gmfzeld, 
616 F.3d 189, 199 (2d Cir.201O) 
("Bea1lmont . .. remain[s] good law. Indeed, 
in the recent Citizens United case, the Court 
. . . explicitly declined to reconsider its 
precedent involving campaign contrib1ltions 
by corporations to candidates for elected 
office."). 
Prevention of actual and perceived 
corruption and the threat of circumvention 
are firmly established government interests 
that support regulations on campaign 
financing. See Bea1lmont, 539 U.S. at 154; 
Nixon, 528 U.S. at 390 ("Even without the 
authority of BlIckley, there would be no 
serious question about the legitimacy of the 
interest[ ] [of preventing corruption and the 
appearance of it] [ ], which, after all, 
underlie[s] bribery and anti-gratuity 
statutes."); B1lckley, 424 U.S. at 27 ("Of 
almost equal concern as the danger of actual 
quid pro quo arrangements [through 
contributions] is the impact of the 
appearance of corruption stemming from 
public awareness of the opportunities for 
abuse."). While clarifying that the anti-
corruption interest is limited to actual quid 
pro quo corruption or the appearance of it, 
as opposed to the appearance of influence or 
access, Citizens United did not deny that 
anti-corruption was a sufficiently important 
governmental interest, which is all that is 
required for closely drawn scrutiny. 130 
S.Ct. at 909-10. Instead, it held that the 
interest did not justify a ban on corporate 
independent expenditures under strict-
scrutiny review.ld. at 911. 
With respect to the antI-circumvention 
interest, the Bea1lmont court explained that 
without limitations on corporate 
contributions, individuals "could exceed the 
bounds imposed on their own contributions 
by diverting money through the 
corporation." 539 U.S. at 155. Thus the 
interest in preventing such evasion is 
grounded in the "experience" of "candidates, 
donors, and parties [that] test the limits of 
the current law, and it shows beyond serious 
doubt how contribution limits would be 
eroded if inducement to circumvent them 
were enhanced." ld. (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). Citizens 
United did not undercut Beallmont's 
endorsement of this interest. Indeed, the 
majority opinion did not even discuss this 
interest when it shuck down the independent 
expenditure ban, and thus prior Supreme 
Court precedent affirming this interest 
remains the law this Court must follow. See 
e.g., FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. 
Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 456 
(2001); Cal. Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 
182(1981). 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the 
district comi erred in granting the 
Appellees' motion to dismiss count four and 
paragraph 1 O(b) of the indictment. The 
district court's grant of the motion to 
dismiss with respect to count four and 
paragraph 1 O(b) is reversed. 
REVERSED 
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"Virginia Appeals Court Affirms Campaign Finance Law" 
Associated Press 
June 29, 2012 
Larry O'Dell 
A federal appeals court ruled Thursday that 
a judge was wrong when he declared a 
century-old ban on corporate campaign 
contributions In federal elections 
unconstitutional. 
U.S. District Judge James Cacheris ruled last 
year that the ban violates corporations' free-
speech rights. In his first-of-its kind ruling, 
Cacheris said it was not logical for an 
individual to be able to donate up to $2,500 
while a corporation "cannot donate a cent." 
Cacheris based his decision on the U.S. 
Supreme Court's landmark 2010 Citizens 
United decision, which struck down a 
prohibition against corporate spending on 
campaign activities by independent groups, 
such as ads by third parties to favor one side. 
However, the Citizens United ruling left 
untouched the ban on direct contributions to 
candidates, the appeals court noted. 
The lower court viewed independent 
expenditures and direct contributions the 
same, saying both are political speech, but 
the appeals court said they must be regulated 
differently. 
"The reason for this difference in scrutiny is 
clear: independent expenditures, by 
definition, are direct means by which 
political speech enters into the marketplace," 
Judge Roger Gregory wrote. "Direct 
contributions, conversely, do not necessarily 
fund political speech but must be 
transformed into speech by an individual 
other than the contributor." 
The Justice Department cited the 
government's interest in preventing 
corruption in defending the contribution 
limit, and the appeals court agreed. 
"Prevention of actual and perceived 
corruption and the threat of circumvention 
are firmly established government interests 
that support regulations on campaign 
financing," Gregory wrote. 
The issue arose when William P. Danielczyk 
Jr. and Eugene R. Biagi, who both live in the 
Washington suburb of Oakton, Va., were 
charged with illegally funneling 
contributions to Hillary Clinton's Senate and 
presidential campaigns. The defendants, 
officers with a corporation called Galen 
Capital Group, allegedly persuaded dozens 
of individuals to contribute to Clinton's 
campaigns and reimbursed them with 
company money. According to prosecutors, 
they tried to cover their tracks by writing 
"consulting fees" on the memo line of 
reimbursement checks and by issuing the 
checks for amounts larger than the 
contributions. 
Cacheris dismissed one count of the 
indictment related to contributions to 
Clinton's 2008 presidential bid, but the 
ruling by the appeals court reinstates it. 
Neither Jeffrey A. Lamken, attorney for 
Danielczyk, nor Lee E. Goodman, attorney 
for Biagi, immediately returned phone 
messages. 
The Justice Department said it was pleased 
with the ruling. 
Judges William Traxler and Judge Albert 
Diaz joined in the panel's decision. 
117 
"Several Clinton Fundraisers Now Facing Criminal Allegations" 
Washington Post 
February 21,2011 
Dan Eggen 
The indictment of a top Northern Virginia 
fundraiser last week is the latest in a series 
of criminal cases that have ensnared 
campaign donors to Hillary Rodham 
Clinton, who relied heavily on wealthy 
bundlers in her failed 2008 bid for the 
presidency. 
Federal grand jury indictments handed up in 
Alexandria allege that Galen Capital Group 
Chairman William P. Danielczyk Jr. and his 
treasurer illegally reimbursed nearly 
$190,000 in donations to Clinton's 2006 and 
2008 campaigns, sometimes with corporate 
funds. 
Under federal law, major fundraisers known 
as bundlers are free to help solicit and 
package what are known as conduit 
contributions for favored candidates, but 
they are not allowed to reimburse other 
donors as a way to evade campaign finance 
limits. 
Employees of Galen Capital, including 
Danielczyk and the other defendant in the 
case, company treasurer Eugene R. Biagi, 
gave more than $50,000 to Clinton's 
campaigns for the Senate in 2006 and for the 
White House in 2008, according to the 
Center for Responsive Politics, which tracks 
money in politics. Danielczyk helped raise 
about $100,000 for the Clinton presidential 
campaign, records show. 
A number of major donors to Clinton, now 
secretary of state, have faced criminal 
allegations in connection with fundraising 
scandals since she dropped out of the race 
for the White House in 2008. Federal 
prosecutors have mounted four major cases 
involving six defendants, who together 
helped raise more than $1.1 million for 
Clinton's presidential and senatorial 
campaigns, records show. 
None of the cases has revealed any 
wrongdoing by Clinton or her top advisers, 
and most of the money has been returned or 
donated to charity. But Craig Holman, 
government affairs lobbyist for the 
watchdog group Public Citizen, said Clinton 
effectively put her campaign at risk by 
relying so heavily on wealthy bundlers to 
help her raise money. 
"When you turn to that traditional wealthy 
donor base, you're going to run into a lot of 
problems because they encompass the type 
of people who know that big money buys 
influence," Holman said. 
The State Department referred questions to 
people who worked on Clinton campaign, 
who did not respond to requests for 
comment Friday. 
Perhaps the most well-known defendant 
linked with Clinton was Norman Hsu, a 
former top Democratic fundraiser who was 
convicted in 2009 of campaign-finance 
fraud for making nearly $100,000 in illegal 
donations through "straw donors." Clinton 
returned about $850,000 to more than 200 
donors linked to Hsu, who also pleaded 
guilty to separate fraud charges for bilking 
investors in a Ponzi investment scheme. 
In another case involving Clinton's 
campaIgn In January, a former business 
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manager for crime novelist Patricia 
Cornwell pleaded guilty to lying about the 
source of nearly $50,000 in donations to 
Clinton. Prosecutors said Evan Snapper used 
funds from Cornwell to reimburse donors 
without the novelist's knowledge. 
Another major Clinton fundraiser, New 
York City investment banker Hassan 
Nemazee, was sentenced to 12 years in 
prison last year for defrauding banks of 
nearly $300 million. Some of the funds were 
given to Democratic politicians, including 
Clinton, Barack Obama and Joseph R. Biden 
Jr., court records showed. 
Nemazee was national finance chairman for 
Clinton's 2008 campaign and served as New 
York finance chairman for the failed 2004 
presidential bid by Sen. John F. Kerry (0-
Mass.). 
Clinton, Obama and other politicians either 
returned most ofNemazee's contributions or 
donated them to charity after his arrest, court 
records show. Hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in other donations to charitable 
foundations-including one headed by 
Clinton's husband, former president Bill 
Clinton-were forfeited to the government. 
As the Nemazee case suggests, many 
presidential candidates have had to grapple 
with fundraising scandals over the years, 
heightening calls from watchdog groups for 
tighter campaign finance regulations. During 
the George W. Bush administration, at least 
half a dozen top Bush bundlers were caught 
up in allegations of illegal fundraising, 
influence peddling or other financial crimes, 
including superlobbyist Jack Abramoff. 
Holman noted that Obama so far has 
avoided any major fundraising controversies 
in connection with his 2008 campaign, 
which broke new ground by relying more 
heavily on small donations than previous 
presidential runs. 
But a major supporter of Obama's 2004 
Senate campaign, Chicago businessman 
Tony Rezko, was convicted of 16 felony 
corruption charges in 2008 for shaking down 
companies seeking state contracts in Illinois. 
Republicans labeled Rezko as "Obama's 
longtime friend and money man" because of 
his past ties to the president, although 
Obama had no connection to the criminal 
case. 
Obama gave past donations linked to Rezko 
to charity. During the 2008 campaign, 
Obama also said he regretted a 
"boneheaded" decision in which he bought a 
slice of property from Rezko to expand the 
size of his Chicago house lot. 
In the most recent case, Danielczyk and 
Biagi are charged with conspiracy, illegal 
reimbursement of contributions and 
obstruction. A personal assistant to 
Danielczyk has agreed to cooperate with 
prosecutors in exchange for pleading guilty 
to a lesser charge. 
119 
"Corporate Contribution Ban Upheld" 
Brennan Center for Justice Blog 
July 2,2012 
Shanna Reulbach 
Amid the excitement over last week's health 
care decision, the Fourth Circuit's major 
campaign finance decision in a case called 
United States v. Danielczyk received 
relatively little attention. However, 
Danielczyk is a cmcially important case, 
affirming the constitutionality of a 
longstanding federal law banning 
corporations from giving campaign 
donations directly to candidates. The 
opinion overturned a flawed lower court 
decision-and limited the reach of Citizens 
United. 
The federal ban on corporate contributions, 
now located in the Bipartisan Campaign 
Finance Reform Act, has been in force since 
Congress passed the Tillman Act in 1907. 
For more than a century, it has been one of 
the core protections against cormption in our 
democracy. 
The Danielczyk case began when two 
businessmen gave corporate money directly 
to Hillary Clinton's 2008 presidential 
campaign. During their trial, they argued 
that after Citizens United, the ban on 
corporate campaign contributions IS 
unconstitutional. In effect, they urged the 
court to find that Citizens United invalidated 
the Supreme Court's 2003 decision in 
F.E. C. v. Beaumont, which recently decided 
that the very same ban was constitutional. 
While the lower cOUli wrongly accepted this 
argument, the FOUlih Circuit found that 
Citizen United's reasoning is limited to 
independent expenditures-the Citizens 
United COUli expressly declined to disturb 
any laws governing direct contributions. 
Circuit Judge Gregory, writing for a three-
judge panel, refuted the proposition that the 
'''corporations-are-equal-to-people' logic 
necessarily applies in the context of direct 
contributions." In other words, nothing 
about Citizens United weakens Beaumont's 
holding that the government can ban 
corporate campaign contributions in order to 
prevent cormption and stop violations of 
other campaign finance laws. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Fourth 
Circuit emphasized the different treatment 
given to direct contributions versus 
independent expenditures-a distinction that 
dates back to the Supreme COUli's seminal 
campaign finance case, B1Ickley v. Valeo. In 
that 1976 case, the Court found that 
independent expenditures implicate greater 
First Amendment rights than campaign 
contributions. This is because, as reaffirmed 
in Beaumont, contributions "do not 
necessarily fund political speech but must be 
transformed into speech by an individual 
other than the contributor." This cmcial 
difference is at the heart of the Fourth 
Circuit's correct decision in Danielczyk, 
limiting the reasoning of Citizens United to 
independent expenditures. 
The Danielczyk court also resolved a 
potential circuit split-another important 
aspect of the decision. While the Second 
Circuit, in Ognibene v. Parks, and the Ninth 
Circuit, in Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 
recently upheld the federal corporate 
contribution ban, the Virginia lower court 
decision threatened to create the appearance 
of unsettled law. According to some experts, 
Danielczyk will "inevitably" be appealed to 
the Supreme Court. But thankfully, without 
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a circuit split, the high Court will not face 
the same pressures to grant review. 
And so, by affirming the corporate 
contribution ban as a valid and meaningful 
protection against corruption, and by 
limiting the reach of Citizens United, the 
Fourth Circuit took an important step 
towards protecting U.S. democracy from 
some of the most damaging effects of 
corporate money in politics. 
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"Corporate Campaign Spending Rights 
Affirmed by High Court" 
Bloomberg 
June 26,2012 
Greg Stohr and Julie Bykowicz 
A divided u.s. Supreme Court threw out 
Montana's ban on corporate campaign 
spending in a reaffirmation of the 2010 
decision that unleashed super-PACs and left 
federal elections awash in money from big 
spenders. 
Deciding they didn't need to hear 
arguments, the justices yesterday summarily 
reversed a Montana Supreme Court decision 
upholding the state's century-old ban. The 
state court had ruled the law's limits could 
stand for state elections even after Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission, the 
two-year-old Supreme Court ruling that let 
corporations and unions spend unlimited 
sums. 
The court's unsigned OpInIOn in the 5-4 
ruling said the case asked whether Citizens 
United applied to a state law. "There can be 
no serious doubt that it does," the court said. 
"Montana's arguments in support" of the 
lower court ruling "either were already 
rejected in Citizens United or fail to 
meaningfully distinguish that case," the 
opinion said. 
The majority was identical to the 5-4 
Citizens United decision, which altered the 
national political landscape and opened the 
way for campaign spending by outside 
groups to more than double from the level 
four years ago. 
Missed Opportunity 
The latest action makes clear the court's five 
Republican appointees stand behind their 
conclusion that corporate campaIgn 
spending is entitled to broad protection 
under the First Amendment. 
"Citizens United mistakenly overruled 
longstanding cases that protected the 
fairness and integrity of elections," White 
House spokesman Eric Schultz said in a 
statement yesterday. "Unfortunately, the 
court today missed an opportunity to correct 
that mistake." 
President Barack Obama criticized the 
Citizens ruling in his 2010 State of the 
Union address. He has since given his 
blessing to a super-political action 
committee supporting his re-election, saying 
it is necessary to compete with Republican 
challenger Mitt Romney. Obama campaign 
aides have said they expect to be outspent by 
Romney and his allies because of several 
super-PACs backing him. 
More than 600 super-PACs have raised 
more than $240 million and spent $133 
million this election cycle, according to the 
Center for Responsive Politics, a 
nonpartisan research group in Washington. 
Nonprofit Organizations 
Nonprofit organizations that don't have to 
repoli donors have spent at least $12.4 
million in this election cycle so far, 
according to the Sunlight Foundation, a 
Washington-based group that promotes 
campaign-finance disclosure. 
The expenditures by super-PACs and 
nonprofits add up to more than twice what 
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outside groups had spent by this point in the 
2008 election cycle, according to the Center 
for Responsive Politics. 
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce said in 
court papers that "to the extent that there has 
been more speech in recent elections, that is 
a First Amendment good, not an excuse to 
resurrect a censorship regime." The business 
trade group opposed the Montana law. 
Outside spending on state and local races-
which include judgeships, ballot measures 
and gubernatorial and mayoral posts-is 
more difficult to tally, in part because of 
differing disclosure requirements and 
deadlines. 
The National Institute on Money in State 
Politics, a campaign-finance research group 
in Helena, Montana, said that in a sample of 
20 states, spending by groups other than 
candidates rose to $139 million in 2010 
from $65 million in 2008. 
State Bans 
Critics of the Citizens United ruling had 
sought to leave room for spending bans at 
the state level, saying they guard against 
corruption. 
"The states have a compelling interest in 
preventing domination of state and local 
elections by nonresident corporate 
interests," argued New York, joined by 21 
other states and the District of Columbia, in 
a court filing backing Montana in the case. 
"The decision today says that other states 
struggling to deal with corrupting political 
spending are essentially handcuffed," Adam 
Skaggs, senior counsel of the Brennan 
Center's Democracy Program at the New 
York University School of Law, said in an 
interview. "The court has removed a 
promising tool for states." 
U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell, the 
Republican Senate minority leader from 
Kentucky, said in a statement the ruling is 
"another important victory for freedom of 
speech." 
There has been "only minimal corporate 
involvement in the 2012 election cycle," 
McConnell wrote in the statement and in a 
brief filed in support of the group seeking to 
toss out Montana's corporate political 
spending ban. 
Secret Donors 
Those committees are required to repoli 
donors; many nonprofit groups that also 
spend money in elections may keep their 
donors secret. 
David Bossie, president of Citizens United, 
the nonprofit behind the Supreme Court case 
of the same name, said in a statement that 
the Montana decision is "another win for the 
First Amendment." 
The five members of the Citizens United 
majority-Chief Justice John Roberts and 
Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, 
Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito-
remain on the court and made up the 
majority in yesterday's decision. Dissenting 
were Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen 
Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. 
At the time of the 2010 Citizens United 
ruling, 22 states had laws banning or 
restricting spending by corporations and 
unions, according to a report this month by 
the Corporate Reform Coalition, made up of 
75 organizations and individuals from good-
governance groups, environmental groups 
and organized labor. Those states generally 
repealed their limits or declared that their 
laws are unenforceable, according to the 
report. 
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Appearance of Corruption 
The exception was Montana, which chose to 
continue enforcing its corporate money ban. 
At issue in the Montana case was the 
statement by the Citizens United majority 
that corporate campaign expenditures "do 
not give rise to corruption or the appearance 
of corruption." That's an important 
conclusion because the court has allowed 
campaign-finance restrictions as a means of 
fighting corruption. 
Montana argued that local and state 
elections are especially susceptible to 
corruption from corporate spending. 
The Supreme Court put a hold on the law in 
February. 
Montanans enacted the 1912 Corrupt 
Practices Act by ballot initiative. In its 5-2 
ruling upholding the law, the Montana 
Supreme Court said the state had "unique 
and compelling interests" in barring 
corporate election spending. The majority 
pointed to the so-called "copper king" battle 
at the beginning of the 20th century, when 
entrepreneur Augustus Heinze and the 
Anaconda Co., controlled by Standard Oil, 
used their money to vie for dominance of the 
state's government. 
Shell of Authority 
When the law was enacted, "the state of 
Montana and its government were operating 
under a mere shell of legal authority, and the 
real social and political power was wielded 
by powerful corporate managers to further 
their own business interests," the Montana 
court majority said. 
The Montana law barred direct election 
spending by corporations, including 
incorporated interest groups. Corporations 
must establish traditional political action 
committees, which can solicit voluntaty 
contributions from employees. The 
committees were subject to contribution 
limits and disclosure requirements. 
The challengers included American 
Tradition Partnership Inc., described on its 
website as opposed to "environmental 
extremism," the Montana Shooting Sports 
Association Inc., a gun rights and firearms-
safety group, and Champion Painting Inc., a 
painting and drywall business with a single 
shareholder. 
The case is American Tradition Partnership 
v. Attorney General for the State of 
Montana, 11-1179. 
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"Has SCOTUS OK'd Campaign Dirty Tricks?" 
Politico 
July 10,2012 
Rick Hasen 
An obscure procedural order issued the day 
after the Supreme Court's decision to uphold 
President Barack Obama's health care law 
got lost in the saturated media coverage of 
the health ruling and the palace intrigue over 
whether Chief Justice John Robelis switched 
his vote and alienated his conservative 
colleagues. Without comment or dissent, the 
justices declined to hear Minnesota's appeal 
of a federal appeals cOUli ruling in 281 Care 
Committee v. Arneson-holding that 
Minnesota's law banning false campaign 
speech about ballot measures is likely 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 
The result could be even nastier campaigns 
and more political dirty tricks. 
Minnesota had asked the Supreme Court to 
hold its petition until the court decided 
United States v. Alvarez, the so-called 
"Stolen Valor" case. The court decided 
Alvarez the same day as health care, striking 
down as a free speech violation a federal law 
making it a crime to falsely claim to be a 
recipient of the Congressional Medal of 
Honor. 
Alvarez casts considerable doubt over when, 
if ever, states can take actions to combat 
false campaign statements and campaign 
dirty tricks-including lying about the 
location of a polling place or the voting date. 
The cOUli could have used the 281 Care 
Committee case to clear up the muddle next 
term. But it just denied the petition. 
Without new clarity, I expect anyone 
charged with making election-related lies to 
raise a First Amendment defense. Which 
they just may win. 
It's too bad the Supreme COUli didn't take 
the 281 Care Committee case, because the 
current uncertainty over false campaign 
speech laws provides an opening for those 
who might consider using political dirty 
tricks in November. The government has a 
compelling interest in stopping that kind of 
voter suppression-even if we don't trust it 
to police campaign statements. 
Before Alvarez, the Supreme Court had 
recognized certain categories of speech and 
expression, like "fighting words," which 
were not entitled to any First Amendment 
protection. The U.S. government, defending 
the Stolen Valor law in Alvarez, relied on 
statements in earlier Supreme Court cases 
suggesting that deliberately false speech is 
similarly undeserving of First Amendment 
protection. 
Four justices, led by Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, rejected the government's 
argument, ruling that laws regulating lying 
are subject to "strict scrutiny" under the 
First Amendment-the court's toughest 
standard of review, under which few laws 
can survive. (The court did indicate that 
celiain longstanding laws barring certain 
false statements, like perjury laws, remained 
constitutional. ) 
"Only a weak society," these four justices 
concluded, "needs government protection or 
intervention before it pursues its resolve to 
preserve the truth. Truth needs neither 
handcuffs nor a badge for its vindication." 
Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice 
Elena Kagan, agreed with Kennedy's 
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conclusion that even false speech is usually 
entitled to some First Amendment 
protection, and that the Stolen Valor law 
was unconstitutional. But Breyer applied an 
"intermediate scrutiny" test for laws 
punishing false speech-determining a law's 
constitutionality by balancing the speaker's 
First Amendment rights against the 
government's interest in preserving the truth 
in particular contexts. 
Breyer's opinion noted the special difficulty 
of laws punishing false statements in the 
context of political campaigns, where 
prosecutors might use false campaign 
speech laws for political reasons, going after 
political opponents. In this area, the "risk of 
censorious selectivity by prosecutors is . . . 
high." 
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"One Mystery, One Order on Elections" 
SCOTUSblog 
June 29, 2012 
Lyle Denniston 
The Supreme Court has left town for the 
summer, and in doing so, has left the state of 
West Virginia waiting in suspense over the 
fate of a federal court ruling that would have 
required its legislature to come up with new, 
equal population districts for electing its 
three members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives this year. But the Court 
has definitely put a stop, for this year's 
elections, at least, to Arizona's plan to 
require voters to prove they are U.S. citizens 
before they may register to take part in 
elections there. 
The Justices have been weighing an appeal, 
filed in March by West Virginia state 
officials, challenging a three-judge District 
Court lUling that ordered state legislators to 
come up with new congressional districts, or 
else that comt would do so itself. The state 
officers' appeal raised a significant issue 
over whether the Constitution now requires 
that the difference in population between 
House districts must either be absolutely 
zero, or as close to that as possible. That is 
what the District Court had declared, on the 
theory that Census data and computer 
science are now so refined that absolute 
equality can be achieved. 
On January 20, before that appeal actually 
had arrived at the Court, the Justices put the 
District Comt ruling on hold until the state 
appeal could be filed, and resolved. 
Preliminary briefing in the case was 
completed on June 5, and the case was 
scheduled for consideration by the Justices 
at their private Conference on June 21. So 
far as anyone in the public knows, the Court 
has taken no action on the case, and the case 
was not scheduled to be considered on 
Thursday with the final Conference of the 
Justices before the summer recess. There is 
no word at the Court on what is happening 
with the case. 
It is not customary for the Court to leave a 
case like that dangling over the summer 
recess. And the underlying constitutional 
dispute would not be resolved merely by the 
stay order issued in January, although that 
had the effect of putting into effect the plan 
adopted by the legislature. The primary 
election, using that plan, has been held, so 
those districts will remain in effect for the 
general election in November. That plan 
was found unconstitutional by a 
divided three-judge comt because the 
majority of the judges said the legislature 
either had to do better to come close to zero 
variation, or else justify the failure to do so 
with explicit reliance on public policy goals 
served by the failure to achieve zero 
variation. 
The maximum variation between the largest 
of the three districts and the smallest created 
by the legislature-approved plan was .79 
percent, or a deviation of a total of 4,871 
persons from the ideal, equal population 
figure of 617,665 for each of the three 
districts. Of the nine different redistricting 
plans that the legislature had considered, 
seven had a lower total variation, while only 
two had higher comparisons. The District 
Court found that it would be possible to get 
closer to zero, and that would be required, 
unless remaining variations were explained 
away. 
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West Virginia officials contended in their 
appeal that their state legislature has had a 
long tradition of shying away from partisan 
fights over the drawing of congressional 
district lines, and has been in the habit, after 
each Census is taken, in making as few 
changes as necessary in the districting array. 
While that case remains in an uncertain state 
on the Court's docket, the Court has turned 
aside a request by Arizona officials to 
postpone a Ninth Circuit Court ruling 
striking down an eight-year-old mandate 
that voters must prove they are U.S. citizens 
in order to get on the election registration 
rolls. (The Justices issued that order on 
Friday, over the dissent of Justice Samuel A. 
Alito, Jr., but the order was overlooked in 
the excitement over the Court's health care 
decision.) 
State officials III Arizona had asked the 
Court to allow election aides to demand 
proof of citizenship before registering any 
individual to vote. The Ninth Circuit had 
ruled in April that the citizenship proof 
requirement conflicts with a 1993 federal 
law passed to make it easier for individuals 
to register to vote-the National Voter 
Registration Act. 
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"Party Challenge to Top 2 Primary Back to Supreme Court?" 
Washington SecretalY of State Blog 
April 19,2012 
David Ammons 
Washington Democrats and Libertarians are 
asking the U.S. Supreme COUli to hear yet 
another challenge of the state's popular Top 
2 Primary. Various appeals have been 
underway since voters approved the system 
by a landslide eight years ago. 
The open primary, which allows all voters to 
select their favorite candidates for each 
office, without regard to party label, has 
been successfully used since 2008, when the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruled 7-2 to allow it. 
The high court did leave open the possibility 
of further challenge based on the way the 
state administered the winnowing election. 
Barring some unexpected development, the 
state plans to use the Top 2 Primary on Aug. 
7 to winnow the field for governor and other 
statewide offices, Congress, the Legislature 
and other offices. The two top vote getters 
will advance to the General Election in 
November, with no party guaranteed a 
runoff spot. 
Both the U.S. District Court and the 9th 
Circuit Court of Appeals have rejected 
arguments by the Democratic, Republican 
and Libertarian parties of Washington that 
their constitutional rights are violated. The 
Republicans have dropped out of the new 
challenge. Just before the deadline late 
Wednesday, the Democrats and Libertarians 
filed separate requests that the high court 
hear a further appeal. 
Secretary of State Sam Reed, the state's 
elections chief, expressed disappointment 
that the Libertarians and Democrats persist 
in their challenge. He said he's pleased that 
Republicans have heeded the request he has 
made repeatedly for all three parties to stop 
challenging a voter-approved system that is 
working well and producing good 
candidates and officeholders. 
"Our system, which is a model for 
other states, really honors the way 
Washingtonians want to vote - for 
the person, not the party label. It 
really fits our populist, independent 
streak and allows people to split their 
ticket, rather than be confined to one 
party's candidates. The parties' 
challenge of our old blanket-primary 
led to our Top 2 system, with a very 
unpopular detour to the Pick-a-Party 
system that limited our primary 
choices to a single party's line of 
candidates. 
"I hope the Supreme Court will 
decline to take the case, and will 
acknowledge that we followed the 
court's road map for how to conduct 
the primary as a nonpartisan, 
winnow election that puts the voter 
in the driver's seat." 
Attorney General Rob McKenna, who 
personally argued the original case before 
the Supreme Court, said: 
"The people of the state of 
Washington have made it clear that 
they suppOli a people's primary-not 
a partisan primary. 
"We've already argued this case all 
the way to the U.S. Supreme Court-
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and won. The Secretary of State's 
office then followed the direction of 
the court to ensure the Top 2 Primary 
was instituted in a manner that 
respects the parties' rights to 
association while still honoring the 
will of the people to vote for the 
person not the patty. 
"During these tough budget times, 
it's unfortunate that we're still forced 
to spend state tax dollars defending 
the will of the people." 
The Democrats, writing in their request to 
the court, complained that the system gives 
the parties no say in which candidate is 
allowed to claim their label. They also said 
the state hasn't been required to show that 
disclaimers on the ballot are adequate 
remedy for voter confusion. The disclaimer 
essentially says that the candidate chooses 
which patty they prefer, but that the party 
may or may not endorse their candidacy. 
Apart from the primary process, the parties 
are able to "nominate" one or more 
candidates for each office-their seal of 
approval. Candidates may publicize that in 
their yardsigns, Voter's Pamphlet and 
advertising. 
The system easily survived a constitutional 
challenge to the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
handed down a 7-2 ruling back in March of 
2008. The state has used the system ever 
since, with polls showing heavy public 
support. But the parties continue to argue 
that the Top 2 system causes voter confusion 
and thereby violates the parties' freedom of 
association. 
In January of last year, U.S. District Judge 
John Coughenour dismissed challenges 
brought by the parties over the way 
Washington operates the primary. Reed and 
Attorney General Rob McKenna called it a 
major victory for the voters of Washington 
and expressed hope that the case was 
resolved at long last. But the parties decided 
to appeal. 
The judge said the state Elections Division 
has carefully adopted the recommendations 
of the high court, making it clear that 
candidates "prefer" a particular party of their 
designation, but that the patty mayor may 
not endorse the candidate. Coughenour 
dismissed the parties' contention that voters 
are confused by the party references. 
He said the system "does not create the 
possibility of widespread confusion among 
the reasonable, well-informed electorate." 
The patties appealed to the 9th Circuit, 
which handles cases from the West. Again, 
the three-judge panel upheld Washington. 
The Secretary of State, represented by 
McKenna, and backed by the Washington 
State Grange, promoters of the Top 2 
Initiative 872, asked the appeals judges to 
agree with the district judge that Washington 
has carefully implemented the primary using 
the roadmap suggested by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Voters are not confused by the 
system and the high court already has said 
the parties do not have a right to demand 
that their favored candidates be identified, 
they said. 
In their latest filing, the Democrats said 
"The 9th Circuit did not independently 
analyze whether, as implemented, 
Washington's system is a reasonable, 
politically neutral regulation that serves an 
important regulatory interest when the 
system provides potentially misleading or 
inaccurate information." The party should be 
allowed to object to use of its name in 
conjunctions with the candidate's in state-
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sponsored publications, the Democrats said. 
Libertarians concurred with the Democrats' 
arguments, including their concerns about 
unauthorized use of their party label or 
trademark and their lack of authority to 
"disavow false candidacies." 
McKenna's attorneys will file reply briefs 
later this spring; there is no clear timeline 
for when the high court might say if the 
justices will hear the case. Statistically, few 
very cases are accepted for review. If it 
were accepted, it likely would be heard 
sometime next year. 
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"New Target In Voter ID Battle: 1965 Voting Rights Act" 
National Public Radio 
August 2, 2012 
Corey Dade 
A landmark federal law used to block the 
adoption of state voter identification cards 
and other election rules now faces 
unprecedented legal challenges. 
A record five federal lawsuits filed this year 
challenge the constitutionality of a key 
provision in the Voting Rights Act. The 
1965 statute prevents many state and local 
governments from enacting new voter ID 
requirements, redistricting plans and similar 
proposals on grounds that the changes would 
disenfranchise minorities. 
The plaintiffs, which include Alabama, 
Florida and Texas, are aiming for the 
Supreme COUli because some justices in a 
previous ruling openly questioned the 
continued need for patis of the Voting 
Rights Act. The high court recently received 
two of the cases on appeal and could take 
them up in the fall term. 
The three states, and two smaller 
communities in Alabama and North 
Carolina, want to regain autonomy over 
their elections, which are under strict federal 
supervision imposed by the Voting Rights 
Act to remedy past discrimination. 
The complaints ask the courts to strike down 
the central provision in the law, known as 
"pre-clearance," which reqUlres 
governments with a history of 
discrimination to get federal permission to 
change election procedures. Pre-clearance is 
enforced throughout nine states and in 
pOliions of seven others. Most of the 
jurisdictions are in the South. 
The Justice Department has used the pre-
clearance provision to reject several of the 
plaintiffs' initiatives, including Texas' strict 
voter 10 law. 
Across the nation, legal battles are 
escalating over a wave of state laws passed 
in the past two years that impose photo 10 
requirements, scale back early voting 
periods and restrict voter-registration effOlis, 
among other changes. The litigation has 
become sharply partisan because the 
changes could influence voter turnout in the 
November elections. Voter ID laws have 
been the most contentious, as nine of the 11 
states that have passed photo ill laws have 
Republican governors. 
Proponents of the Republican-led initiatives 
say their intent is to prevent voter fraud and 
shore up the election system. Opponents, 
mainly Democrats and voting and civil 
rights groups, insist the measures are aimed 
at suppressing turnout among minorities and 
young people, who tend to vote for 
Democratic candidates. The Justice 
Department has challenged many of these 
measures in lawsuits filed under the Voting 
Rights Act. 
Challengers argue that they should no longer 
be forced to comply with the pre-clearance 
mandate because efforts to prevent 
minorities from registering, voting or 
winning elected office were abolished many 
years ago. 
"These jurisdictions have made enormous 
strides in increasing minority patiicipation 
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in elections and voter registration, but also 
in the election of minority officials," says 
Washington attorney Michael Carvin. He 
represents the plaintiffs in the Kinston, N.C., 
case, which is one of two jurisdictions that 
have petitioned the Supreme Court. 
Critics Question Methodology 
Since its passage, judges have consistently 
upheld the Voting Rights Act and Congress 
has reauthorized it four times based on 
determinations that discrimination in 
elections continues. The civil rights law is 
widely considered the most effective of its 
kind in U.S. history. 
But a push to scale back the statute gained 
momentum from the last challenge before 
the Supreme Couti, in 2009. The justices 
declined to answer the constitutional 
question but signaled that the law's future 
isn't assured. 
"In pati due to the success of that 
legislation, we are now a very different 
Nation," Chief Justice John Robelis wrote in 
the majority opinion, adding that continued 
enforcement "must be justified by current 
needs." 
Roberts was alluding to one of the strongest 
criticisms of the pre-clearance provision and 
one detailed in the federal complaints-that 
enforcement is determined by a formula of 
minority voting statistics from 1964, 1968 
and 1972. The methodology fails to account 
for decades of gains in minority voting and 
representation in office. 
Critics fault Congress for failing to update 
the formula when it reauthorized the statute 
in 2006 for another 25 years. Many state and 
local officials believe that the use of current 
figures would exempt most jurisdictions 
from pre-clearance, as Alabama explained in 
its complaint filed last week: 
"[I]t is no longer constitutionally justifiable 
for Congress to arbitrarily impose 
disfavored treatment on Alabama and other 
covered jurisdictions by forcing them to 
justify all voting changes to federal officials 
... for another 25 years even though, if the 
coverage formula were applied using 2000, 
2004 and 2008 voter registration and 
participation rates, Alabama would no 
longer be covered." 
Alabama has long chafed at compliance and, 
in 1965, was the first jurisdiction to 
challenge the Voting Rights Act. The 
Supreme Court ruled against the state. 
But supporters credit pre-clearance, as the 
enforcement arm of the law, with breaking 
the most blatant and unrepentant systems of 
discrimination. 
"It has been extraordinarily successful at 
changing people's habits," says veteran civil 
rights attorney Armand Derfner of South 
Carolina, who has successfully argued 
voting rights cases before the Supreme 
Court. He represents the League of Women 
Voters in a lawsuit against South Carolina's 
voter ID law. "I think a lot of public officials 
actually like pre-clearance because it keeps 
the government bodies on their toes." 
Clearest Impact in the South 
Most data show minority voter participation, 
both in registration and balloting, has 
gradually increased since the 1960s. 
The Pew Research Center says the 2008 
elections had the most diverse U.S. 
electorate, as nonwhites made up nearly 24 
percent. Whites' share of total turnout 
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dropped 3 percentage points from 79 percent 
in 2004. 
Black turnout reached a record 65 percent in 
2008, compared with 55 percent in 1988, 
according to the Pew study. Driven by 
Barack Obama's presidential campaign, 
blacks voted at the same rate as whites for 
the first time. 
The greatest impact of the Voting Rights 
Act is clear among blacks in the South. 
In the 1964 presidential election, 72 percent 
of blacks in the Northeast, Midwest and 
West voted, according to the Census Bureau. 
Only 44 percent of blacks in the South cast 
ballots. 
By 2008, black turnout in the South reached 
63 percent, surpassing black turnout in all 
other regions, the Census data show. 
"No rational person can think the South of 
today looks anything like the South of the 
1960s," Carvin says. "There's no cognizable 
difference between the South and other 
jurisdictions. " 
Increased minority voting also has boosted 
minority representation in local, state and 
federal elected offices. 
More than 1 0,500 blacks held elected posts 
last year, compared with 1 ,469 in 1970, 
according to the National Roster of Black 
Elected Officials. 
The number of elected Hispanics reached 
5,850 last year, a gain of 87 percent since 
1984, according to the National Association 
of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials. 
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"Legal Battles Erupt Over Tough Voter ID Laws" 
The New York Times 
July 19,2012 
Ethan Bronner 
Four years ago as Viviette Applewhite, now 
93, was making her way through her local 
Acme supermarket, her pocketbook hanging 
from her shoulder, a thief sliced the bag 
from its straps. 
A former hotel housekeeper, Ms. 
Applewhite, who never had a driver's 
license, was suddenly without a Social 
Security card. Adopted and twice married, 
she had several name changes over the 
years, so obtaining new documents was 
complicated. As a result, with Pennsylvania 
now requiring a state-approved form of 
photo identification to vote, Ms. 
Applewhite, a supporter of President 
Obama, may be forced to sit out 
November's election for the first time in 
decades. 
Incensed, and spurred on by liberal groups, 
Ms. Applewhite and others like her are suing 
the state in a closely watched case, one of a 
number of voter-identification suits across 
the country that could affect the 
participation of millions of voters in the 
presidential election. 
"They're trying to stop black people from 
voting so Obama will not get re-elected," 
Ms. Applewhite said as she sat in her 
modest one-bedroom apaIiment in the 
Germantown section of Philadelphia, 
reflecting a common sentiment among those 
who oppose the law. "That's what this 
whole thing is about." 
Whether true or not, the focus on what 
Democrats call "voter suppression" is 
accelerating as the Nov. 6 election looms. 
Last week, Texas took the Obama 
administration to federal court because it 
blocked a voter identification law there on 
racial discrimination grounds. In Florida, 
officials successfully sued for access to a 
federal database of noncitizens in hopes of 
purging them from voter rolls, a move 
several other states plan to emulate. 
Advocates say the laws have nothing to do 
with voter suppression and are about 
something else entirely: ensuring the 
integrity of elections, preventing voter fraud 
and improving public confidence in the 
electoral process in an era when photo 
identification is routine for many basic 
things, including air travel. 
Thirty-three states have passed laws 
requiring identification for voting. Five-
Pennsylvania, Indiana, Kansas, Tennessee 
and Georgia-have what are called strict 
photo identification requirements, meaning 
voters must present specific kinds of photo 
IDs before voting. Six states-Michigan, 
South Dakota, Idaho, Louisiana, Hawaii and 
Florida-have less strict photo 
requirements, meaning voters may be able to 
sign affidavits or have poll workers who 
recognize them verify their identities. 
Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. said last 
week of the Texas statute, "We call those 
poll taxes," a reference to fees that were 
once used in some Southern states to prevent 
blacks from voting. He said that while 8 
percent of whites do not have the type of 
documentation that would be required by the 
Texas election law, the percentage among 
blacks is triple that. 
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Opponents of the laws note that nearly every 
state legislature that has passed them in the 
past two years is Republican-run and that 
those most affected are minority groups and 
the urban poor, constituencies that tend to 
vote Democratic. 
In a report issued on Wednesday, the 
Brennan Center for Justice at New York 
University School of Law said it had found 
that obtaining proper voter identification in 
the affected states was difficult. More than 
10 million eligible voters live more than 10 
miles from their nearest ID-issuing office, 
and many of the offices maintain limited 
hours, the repOli said. Moreover, it said, 
despite pledges to make voter identification 
free, bilih and marriage certificates, often 
needed for the process, cost $8 to $25, and 
many affected voters are poor. 
The argument by the Pennsylvania law's 
proponents that it has nothing to do with 
patiisan politics took a blow late last month 
when Mike Turzai, the majority leader of the 
state's House of Representatives, addressed 
a group of fellow state Republicans. Listing 
the accomplishments of the Republican-
controlled legislature, he said, "Voter ID-
which is going to allow Governor Romney 
to win the state of Pennsylvania-done." 
In Wisconsin, a voter identification 
requirement has been declared to be in 
violation of the state Constitution, but that 
ruling is expected to be appealed. Some 
Southern states, like Texas and South 
Carolina, have to clear any voting law 
changes with the Department of Justice 
under the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The 
department has rejected their identification 
requirements as discriminatory, and this past 
week Texas has been challenging that ruling 
in federal court in Washington. In 
September, South Carolina will take its case 
against the depaliment to court. 
One of the most closely watched cases is 
here in Pennsylvania, where polls show a 
tight race shaping up between Mr. Obama 
and Mitt Romney, the former Massachusetts 
governor. 
"We don't know whether voter fraud is a 
huge or a small problem, but we believe the 
new law will preserve the integrity of every 
vote," said Ronald G. Ruman, spokesman 
for the Pennsylvania Department of State. 
"The goal is to make sure that every vote 
cast counts." 
Supporters also point to accusations that 
Acorn, a community organizing group that 
worked to register minority group members, 
was engagmg m voter registration fraud 
several years ago. 
This month, the Pennsylvania Depatiment of 
State estimated that 759,000 registered 
voters may be at risk of not having the 
required identification. It promised to send a 
letter to each one explaining what needed to 
be done. 
"Obama won Pennsylvania in 2008 by 
600,000 votes," said Witold Walczak, legal 
director of the American Civil Liberties 
Union of Pennsylvania, which is leading the 
challenge to the law. "What is most galling 
is to hear the law's proponents argue that 
one person voting improperly undermines 
the integrity of the election. What about all 
the people prevented improperly from 
voting? Doesn't that undermine the integrity 
of the election?" 
When the trial against the law statis this 
month in the capital, Harrisburg, Mr. 
Walczak will put on the stand a number of 
Pennsylvanians with cases like Ms. 
Applewhite's, asseliing that they are unable 
to meet the requirements in time for the 
November election. 
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Among them will be Wilola Shinholster 
Lee, a 60-year-old retiree who was born in 
Georgia and has been unable to replace her 
birth celiificate, which was lost in a house 
fire. Officials in Georgia told her that they 
too had suffered a fire and no longer had a 
record of her birth. 
"I came here when Twas 5 with my 
grandmother, who worked as a domestic," 
Ms. Lee said. "She's 98 and doesn't have a 
photo ID either. She's upset because she 
loves Obama." 
Ms. Lee has a Social Security card and an 
employee photo identification from her 
years working for the Philadelphia Board of 
Education. But without her birth certificate, 
she is unlikely to be able to vote in 
November. 
In 2008, the Supreme COUli upheld 
Indiana's voter identification law, saying 
that although there was little evidence of 
fraud, the law did not pose an undue burden 
on voters. But the case in Pennsylvania is 
based on the state Constitution, which is 
more specific than the federal Constitution 
about the right to vote. The Pennsylvania 
law also has tighter restrictions than the one 
in Indiana. 
Stewali 1. Greenleaf, a Republican state 
senator in Pennsylvania and chairman of the 
judiciary committee, said in an interview in 
Harrisburg that he opposed the law because 
it was unnecessary given how uncommon 
in-person voter fraud has been. That will be 
a central argument in the lawsuit as well. 
Mr. Walczak of the civillibeliies union said: 
"The real danger from this law will come 
from people who don't even know it exists 
or who think they have the right TD but 
don't. Our position is that we will not know 
until Election Day how big a problem it is, 
and then it will be too late." 
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